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ARTICLES
The Invisible Web at Work! Artificial
Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance
in the Workplace
Richard A. Bales?‘ & Katherine V.W. Stone”
Employers and others who hire or engage workers to perform services
use a dizzying array ofelectronic mechanisms to make personnel decisions
about hiring, worker evaluation, compensation, discipline, and retention.
These electronic mechanisms include electronic trackers, surveillance
cameras, metabolism monitors, wearable biological measuring devices, and
implantable technology. With these tools, employers can record their
workers ’ every movement, listen in on their conversations, measure minute
aspects ofperformance, and detect oppositional organizing activities. The
data collected is transformed by means of artificial intelligence (A1)
algorithms into a permanent electronic resume that can identijfv andpredict
an individual3 performance as well as their work ethic, personality, union
proclivity, employer loyalty, and future health care costs. The electronic
resumeproduced by AI will accompany workersfromjob tojob as they move
around the boundaryless workplace. Thus AI and electronic monitoring
produce an invisible electronic web that threatens to invade workerprivacy,
deter unionization, enable subtleforms ofemployer blackballing, exacerbate
employment discrimination, render unions ineflective, and obliterate the
protections ofthe labor laws.
This article describes the many ways AI is being used in the workplace
and how its use is transforming the practices of hiring, evaluating,
1'. RichaidA.BalesisaPmfessorofInwat0hioNonhemUniversityandaVisitingProtessorof
Law (2018 20) at the University ofAh0n Law School. He would liketo give special thanksto Susan
MaryAltmeyer, University ofAkron Law School, for her help on section 11-0
11'. Katherine V.W. Stone is the Aijay and Fiances Fearing Miller Pmfessorof
Lawa1UCLASehoolofI.nw.ShethnnksAdnanBu1lerofUCLASchoo|ofLawforexceptional
tesearchaxsistanoe.
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compensating, controlling, and dismissing workers. It then focuses on five
areas of law in which AI threatens to undermine worker protections: anti-
discrimination law, privacy law, antitrust law, labor law, and employee
representation. Finally, this article maps out an agendaforfuture law reform
and research.
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IN'I‘RODUCI‘ION
Although the workplace has become boundaryless, it has not become
random.‘ Today, workers have many different types of relationships with
companies, from conventional long-term employment to the occasional
project or “gig.” They often have multiple interlocking and cascading tiers of
employers all at once,’ and employee leasing firms, payroll contractors,
human resources (HR) service providers, and numerous types of ancillary
enterprises also perform employer fimctions. Workers perform their services
in many different locations, including their homes, coflee shops, private
automobiles, or WeWork shared spaces. But while the location may be
flexible, the job fluid, and the identity of the employer elusive, the worker
operates within an invisible electronic web that measures, quantifies,
analyzes, and ultimately shapes essential features of the work experience.
Employers and others who hire, retain, or engage workers to perform
services utilize a dizzying array of electronic mechanisms—including
trackers, listening devices, surveillance cameras, metabolism monitors, and
wearable technology—to watch their workers, measure their performance,
avoid disruption, and identify shirking, theft, or waste. These mechanisms
can observe each worker’s every movement, both inside and outside the
workplace, and during and afier working hours. The data collected are
1. A “boundaryless workphee” is me in which the long-term bond between workers and
employers has become attenuated and employees more readily fiom one to another. See generally
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITSZ EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE 2004). See also Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Aljplcal Employees:
Employment Lawfor Workers mthout Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (2006); Katherine V.W. Stone, A Fatal MI:-Match: Employer-Centric Beneflu In a
Boundaryless Workplace, ll LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 451 (2007); Katherine V.W. Stone, Employee
Representation In the Bouudarylexx Wontplace. 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773 (2002). The author selected
1heterm“boundaryless workphce”toevokeandbuilduponflIeoonoeptsofa“bmmdarylesscueer,”u
used in the orgmimionnl behavior field, andthenotion ofe “bamchryless company,” as discussed in the
field ofmanagement. See STONE, FROM WIDGETS To DIGITS, supra, at 92 94 and references cited therein.
2. See DAVID WEIL, 'I‘I-IE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 223 (2014).
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transfomied by means of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms into a
permanent electronic resume that companies are using to track and assess
current workers, and it could potentially be shared among companies as
workers move around the boundaryless workplace from job to job. This
invisible electronic web threatens to invade worker privacy, deter
unionization, enable subtle forms of employer blackballing, exacerbate
employment discrimination, render unions ineffective, and obliterate the
protections of the labor laws.
This article maps developments in AI as well as the dangers posed by
the spread ofAI and electronic data gathering in the workplace. In Part I, we
discuss the growing use ofAI and electronic data gathering in HR practices.
After describing the enormous potential and many uses of AI, we describe
how AI’s use in the workplace has transformed the practices of hiring,
evaluating, compensating, and dismissing workers. We also discuss the
emerging types ofelectronic devices used to gather the data necessary to the
operation ofAI.
In Part II, we analyze the legal issues that arise from the invisible web
of HR-oriented AI that increasingly permeates the boundaryless workplace.
Specifically, we focus on four areas in which AI threatens to undermine
worker protections: anti-discrimination law, privacy law, antitrust law, and
labor law. We also consider the challenges AI poses for unions in their role
ofprotecting workers and promoting workplace justice.
In Part III, we conclude with an agenda for future research and some
proposals for legal reform. These include research on whether and how AI
may have a discriminatory effect on minorities, women, or other
disadvantaged groups when it is deployed for monitoring, career-tracking,
disciplining, and firing workers; expanding worker privacy rights to give
workers more protection in the collection and use of their personal and
professional data; antitrust restrictions on the ability of companies to share
Workers’ personal and professional data; and a clear duty on employers to
disclose AI linked surveillance and to bargain with unions over workplace
monitoring and data collection.
I. THE INVISIBLE WEB: AI IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Human Resources by Algorithm
Artificial intelligence (AI) is everywhere: Alexa is in our homes,
autonomous vehicles are prevalent in mining and agriculture,’ and AI is
3. Alex Davies & Aarian Marslnll, Are We There Yet? A Reality Check on Self-Driving Cars,
WIRED (Apr. 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), hflps://www.wired.coui/story/fimire-of-nansponation-self-driving
cars-reality-check/ [hnpsz//pemn.cc/G47V-8P4J].
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increasingly making personnel decisions in the workplace.‘ AI likely will
disrupt every context it touches. In the workplace, for example, it will
eliminate broad categories ofjobs, create broad categories of new ones, and
transform others.5 Indeed, to say that AI will transform the worlcplace‘—and
the world—as we know it is a significant understatement. A report from the
International Bar Association calls it the fourth industrial revolution.’ An
equally apt description might be a fourth era in production.“
Employers already are using Alto screenjob applications, interview and
assess applicants, track the physical movement of workers, assess
performance and recommend promotions and pay rates, and monitor
workers’ emails and phone calls and non-worktime social media activity.°
But the laws governing the workplace largely predate the digital age and are
not adequate to address the challenges it poses.'°
1. The Vast and Enlarging Scope ofAI Capabilities in the Production
Process
a. Data Mining and Deep Learning
AI has been defined as “a branch of computer science dealing with the
simulation of intelligent behavior in computers.”" AI gathers and analyzes
huge troughs ofdata and uses it to sense, comprehend, act, and learn." AI is
4. See infra Part LB.
5. Seegenerally AJAY AGRAWAL, JOSHUA GANS, & AVI GOLDFARB, PREDICIION MACHINES: THE
SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF AR'I1I-'IcIAL INTELLIGENCE (2018); PAUL R. DAUGHERTY & H. JAMES WILSON,
HUMAN + MACHINE: REIMAGINING WORK IN THE AGE 01-‘ A1 (2018).
6. See Alxvpy: The Workplace of the Future, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2018),
httpsz//www.eoonoInist.oom/leada'sI‘20l8/03/28/the-workplace-of-the-fimue [h1tps://perma.cdUU4K-
JLSL]; Hire Education: Managing Hanan Resources is About to Become Easier, THE ECoNoMIs'r (Mar.
28, 2018), httpsz//www.economist.com/special-rqaort/2018/03/28/managing-human-reso1nces-is-about-
to-become-easier [ https:/lpenna.cc/4A5R-DQ8J]; see also Jelfrey M. Hirsch, Future Work, U. ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) [innoduction] (suggesting that technclogy’s potenthl to dis-uptthe labormarket
my lnve reached a “tipping point” risking lahonmiest and violence).
7. INT’L BAR Ass’N GLOB. EMP’T INsT., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS AND THEIR
IMPACT oN THE WORKPLACE 11 (Apr. 2017) ("TBA"). The first was industrialization; the second was
electrification; the third was digitalimtion. Id.
8. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Riqiture and Invention: The Changing Nature of Work and the
Irnplicationsfor Social Policy, CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF US LABOR LAW: REINVENTING LABOR LAW
FoR'n-IE21sr CENTURY (Richard Bales et 11]., ed., forthcoming 2020). The first was artisanal production;
thesecondwas industrialproductiou;thethirdwasdigital production; thefounhisanewemofworkplace
production.
9. See infra Part II.
10. AI-spy, supra note 6 (“Few laws govvem hnwdata are collected at work . . . .”).
11. Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-WEBS'l'ER, h11ps://www.men'iam-
webster.com/dictionary/aitificial%20iutelligence [httpsz//peru1a.cc/NN3L-2F5L] (last visited Nov. 3,
2019).
12. DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 3.
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a large category that includes machine leaming, pattern recognition, problem
solving, and adaption to changing circtunstances.”
The volume of stored data is immense and growing exponentially."
Although data sets can have economic value in their own right” (consider
Facebook’s sale ofdata to makers ofmobile phones and other devices“), the
highest—level value is in analyzing that data to predict future behavior based
on detectable pattems.” This is accomplished by using data to create a set of
algorithms that attempt to model high-level abstractions.“ For example, feed
a computer a million images of cats with the label “cat,” along with a similar
number of images ofother animals without the “cat” label, and the machine
will “leam”'° through trial and error to distinguish cats from other four-
legged creatures.” Feed enough medical images to a computer and the job of
radiologist may become obsolete.“
Key to the recent explosion of AI is rapidly increasing computer power
and the decreasing cost of harnessing it.” As the cost of processing data
decreases, the ability to use existing data to create new data—and to make
13. Bernard Man", The Key Definitions Ofxlnmcial Intelligence (AI) Thai Explain Its Importance,
FORBES (Feb. 14, 2018, 1:27 AM), ht1psJlwww.forbes.com/sites/bemardmnrrI20l8/02/l4/the-key-
definitions-of-mfificial-mteuigaice-ai-mat-exphm-im-hnportance/#72f42e084t5d
[httpsz//perma.cc/9KVA-A6EC].
14. By one estimate, the worldwide volume ofdata is expected to be more than 100 zettnbytes
(l00,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) in 2020, ten times the volume in 2006. IBA, supra note 7, at 99 (citing





See, e.g., Maria Armental, Apple Iigfiiens Privacy Rules on Siri Recordings AflerBacklash, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 28, 2019, 4:00 PM), https:/lwww.wsj.com/articles/apple-tiglrtens-privacy-nrles-on-listaring4n-sirh
recordings-11567013482 [httpsz//perrna.cc/5414 2FWZ] (discussing Apple's use ofSiri to surreptitiously
record and retain audio conversations about sarsitive subjects such as medical conditions). This, in turn,
nukes it possible to monitor workers in ways they my not immediately recognize. Just as a Roomba's
rizingtheconfigurationofourhouseseemsinnocuousrmtilwerealizethatrhtaarebeingsentto
RoombaInc.,wearinga“smnrt”nametagtlntgivesyouaecesstolockeddoorsintheworkplneeseems
innocuous until you realize it's also tracking every minute you spend in the bathroom and every person
you talk to throughout the thy. See generally infia Part 0.
15. IBA, supra note 7, at 107 (characterizing data as “the oil of the fixture”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
16. Gabriel J.X. Dance, Nicholas Confessore & Michael LaForgia, Facebook Gave Device Makers
Deep Access to Data on Users and Friends, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 3 2018),
https://www.nytimes.oomf1nteractive/2018/06/03ltechnology/facebook-device-partners-users-fi'iend&
data.html [https:lIperma.cc/62T2-ZSTM].
17. AGRAWALETAL, supra notes, at 23 51.
18. IBA, supra mte 7, at 10.
19. See DAUGHI-JRTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 60 63 (describing different types of machine
learning).
20. AGRAWAL Er AL, supra note 5, at 38.
21. Id. at 145 48.
22. AGRAWAL El'AL., supra note 5, at 11 17.
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predictions—increases. These predictions can be used to control autonomous
cars,” manage supply chains,“ and monitor peoples’ abilities, actions, and
proclivities.” From 2015 to 2017, the value of AI-related mergers and
acquisitions increased about 26-fold, to $22 billion.“ The corporate market
for AI sofiware, hardware, and services is forecast to grow from $12 billion
in 2017 to $58 billion in 2021.27 This investment money is being charmeled
into data mining and deep leaming, robotics, computer vision, and speech
recognition.
b. Robotics and AI
Robots are hardly new on the factory floor. From assembly-line
conveyor belts to robotic arms, machines used to perform discrete tasks have
been a staple of factories for more than a century.” In the 1940s and 1950s,
numerically controlled machines that could perform multiple and
reprograrmnable tasks were introduced. In the mid-1970s, computerized
numerically controlled (CNC) machines were developed. CNC technology
enables computer operators to control, and instantly modify, not only the
immediate task but also the feed rate, velocity, positioning, tolerances,
location, and speeds ofmachines used for production.” In the late 1970s, the
automotive industry pioneered the use of giant programmable robots that
have multiple “arms” and “hands” and are able to perform multiple assembly
operations.”
Today, robots are operated by AI. AI-enabled robots can “learn” new
tasks in ways their predecessors could not. “Deep reinforcement learning”
occurs when a robot is given instructions for a desired outcome and then uses
trial and error to find a solution.“ Moreover, robots can use “distributed
23. See, e.g., X. Du et a1., Bio-LSYM: A Btomechantoally Inspired Recurrent Neural Networkfor3-
D Pedestrian Pave and Gatt Prediction, [4, No. 2] IEEE ROBOTICS AND AUTOMATION LEITERS 1501,
1501 1508 (2019), In1ps'Jf1eeexplore.ieee.org/document/8626436 [https'J/penna.cc/QU7E-NHD'I'].
24. See, e.g., Steve Banker, 20 Things To Know About Arttflctal Intelligence For Supply Chain
Management, FORBES (Jan. 1, 2019, 4:54 AM),
httpsj/www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker/2019/0 l/01f20-things-to-know-about-ar1ificial-intelligence-
for-supply-chain-management/#5cacll7d537l [httpsz//penna.cclQ825 6F9C].
25. See Infra Part I.B.
26. AI-Spy, supra note 6.
27. AI Pmvtders Will Increasingly Compete wttli Management Cons-ultanctm, THE EcoNoMIsr
(Mar. 28, 2018), htxps://www.economjst.oom/special-rqaort/2018/03/28lai-providers-wil1-increasingly-
compae-with-management-conmllancies [lmpszl/perIna.odNN4T-MVJAI.
28. DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 23.
29. See generally DAVID F. NOBLE, FORCES or Pxooucnonz A Socw. HISTORY or INnus'nuA1.
AUTOMATION (1984).
30. ForanoverviewoftheconcisehistoryofindusuialmbotsseegenemllyA.Gasparet.to,L.
Scalera, A BrtefHtstoIy ofIndustrialRobotics In the 20th Century, 8 ADVANCES IN HISTORICAL STUDIES
1 (2019).
31. DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 49.
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9machine learning’ —in which multiple computers learn together and share
this learning with each other—to learn from one another, so that eight arms
working together for an hour can “learn” what one arm could learn in eight
hours, and then can instantly share that knowledge with all the other robots
on the factory floor.” This represents a new and qualitative leap in the
mechanization ofproduction.
c. Computer Vision, Amplification, and Speech Recognition
Computer vision “teach[es] computers to identify, categorize, and
understand the content within images and video, mimicking and extending
what the human visual system does.”” Now-familiar examples include
programs that enable autonomous cars to distinguish pedestrians from
inanimate objects or to recognize wildlife that might dart onto the road and
create a hazard. Computer vision also, as described above, enables factory
robots to detect human workers and avoid injuring them.
AI can amplify human workers’ sensory and analytical abilities,
allowing them to do things they otherwise could not. For example,
Autodesk’s Dreamcatcher software uses next-generation computer-assisted
design algorithms to create alternative design options based on specified
parameters such as functional requirements, material type, manufacturing
method, perfonnance criteria, and cost restrictions.” Upskill’s augmented
reality program, Skylight, uses smart glasses to visually overlay precise
instructions over a worker’s natural field of vision, significantly reducing
training time and mistakes.” Applications include jobs in field service (such
as servicing wind turbines), manufacturing (such as wiring the electrical
systems in airplanes), and materials handling (such as picking and kitting in
warehouses)?‘
Just as Al is enabling computers to “ earn” from “visual” inputs, it is
also progressing rapidly in speech and audio recognition. Computers can be
used to analyze audio signals in high-noise enviromnents such as factory
floors.” They are becoming increasingly adept at recognizing speech and
converting it to text, translating words into different languages, and using
32. Id. at 50.
33. Id.at 115 16.
34. See Project Dreamcatclier, AUTODESK RESEARCH,
lzittps://auiodeskresearch.com/projects/illeamcatcher) [hiipsz//pemncc/YGJ2 5Ul'E] (lastvisited Oct. 16,
0 9).
35. See How Skylight Works, UPSKILL, lmps://q)skill.io/skyIight/how-it-works/
[https://penna.cc/NZ8Z-291-[G] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
36. See Augmented Reality for Material Handing, UPSKIL1,
https://upskill.io/skyliglit/iinu:tions/uiaterial-handling/ [https://perma.ccf2DDS-PLBZ] (last visited Oct.
16, 2019).
37. DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 64.
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verbal commands to control other machines or devices.” Some supporters of
AI predict that AI will be able to use audio and video inputs to analyze a
person’s honesty, sentiment, and personality.” As described below, AI is
increasingly being deployed in this way to conduct job interviews.” Thus,
the enhanced ability of computers to learn, analyze, and augment humans’
natural abilities is increasingly being used to manage the workforce, as the
next section demonstrates.
B. AI in the Workplace
AI increasingly permeates HR practices in the workplace. Tenned
“People Analytics,” AI is used to guide HR decisions for many areas,
including making hiring decisions, monitoring performance, predicting an
individual’s work trajectory, evaluating workers to set compensation, and
determining an employee's likelihood of terminating the employment
relationship. Although the use of AI in the workplace is exploding, there is
no precise data on its extent. Anecdotally, in the last five years, AI vendor
booths at HR conventions have gone from zero to thirty to forty.“ Moreover,
most major business and management schools have held conferences and
instituted classes on the subject of People Analytics."
Below we describe some of the ways AI is being used, or is likely to be
used in the near future, in the workplace. Each application of AI is fiaught
with legal implications, which will be explored subsequently in Part II.
I. Hiring
a. Recruiting and SortingApplicants
Johnson & Johnson, a consumer products company, receives 1.2 million
applications each year for 25,000 open positions, a ratio ofnearly 50:1,“ and
it is hardly alone.“ AI systems, like the one provided by talent-acquisition
38. Id.
39. See infra Part I.B.l.b(ii).
40. See infra Part I.B.l .
41. See, e.g., The vendor list at the 2019 convention for the Society of Human Resources
Management. Exhibitors, Society for Human Resource Management Annual Conference and Exposition
(Jun. 23 26, 2019), mtpsv/expocad.shnn.mg/Ann2019/edfomalattardee/hflex5.aspx#fpPanel
[httpsz//penm.ccJT44A-QZBL].
42. See, e.g., Wharton People Analytics Conference, The Wlnrton School, University of
Pennsylvania (Apr. 2 3, 2020), https://wpa.wharton.upenn.edu/conference/ [https://perrm.ccl4P74—
VMBE] (an annual conference at Wharton Business School); Jeffiey Polzer, Reimagining Management
through People Analytics, Harvard Bus. Sch. Dig. Initiative, (2017), https://digital.hbs.edu/daia-and-
analysis/di-ta.Ik-reinnginirrg-rnanagernerrt-people-a.ualyticd [https://perrnacc/SGW7-GBPP].
43. Hire Education, supra note 6.
44. See David D. Savage & Richard Bales, Video Games in Job Interviews: Using Algorithms to
Minimize Discrimination and Unmnscious Bros, 32 ABA J. IAB. 8: EMP. L. 211, 215 nn. 37 42 (2017).
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company Hiredscore,“ use keyword searches to scan and sort applications
much faster than a human can.“ Even if an applicant is unqualified for the
particular job for which she has applied, that applicant may be a perfect fit
for a different job at the same company. AI systems can redirect applicants
to openings for which the applicant might be a better fit, or keep the
application “on file” and notify the applicant when a suitable job later
becomes available.“ HiredScore maintains a database of applicants and,
when a vacancy opens, automatically creates a shortlist of previous
applicants who would be a good fit for the new opening.“ Kronos Sofiware
uses algorithms to recruit, screen, track, hire, and complete employee
verification ofapplicants.”
AI systems are designed to “look” beyond an applicant's resume and
cover letter to discern patterns that might predict performance. For example,
the technology and gaming company Nvidia has created an in-house
applicant-tracking software package, which found that applicants submitting
particularly long resumes tend to underperform on the job compared to their
more concise peers.” Other AI investigations might identify other
measurable factors that correlate with job tenure, employee attitude, upward
advancement, disciplinary record, or personality fit with the company.“ The
use of such technology to attract, test, sort, and (as discussed immediately
below) evaluate applicants raises a host of possible discrimination, privacy,
and antitrust issues.”
b. Interviewing and Evaluating Applicants
Most HR professionals acknowledge that application forms and job
interviews alone are not particularly effective methods of evaluating job
candidates because the persons responsible for gathering and interpreting
information may have poor judgement or individual preferences that do not
45. See HIREDSOORE, hnpszllhiredscorecornl [https://perma.cc/’I2PV-NG8V] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
46. Hire Eduwtion, supra note 6.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Talent Acquisition, KRONOS, hltps://www.kmnos.comIproducts/talent-acquisition
[httpsz//perma.ot'l6AVL-l-I'l'X7] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019); see also Harris Mueen, Book Note, Weapons
ofMath Destnuttion: How Big Data Increasa Inequality and Threatens Denroaucy, 39 BERKELEY J.
EMF. & 1.43. L 285 (2018).
50. I-lire Education, supra note 6.
51. Foradiscussion ofhow recmiters,annedwithAI,havedeveloped waystogobeyondfinetlme
and widen searches for job candidates, see Noam Schieber, AJ. as Talent Scout: Unorthodax Hires, and
Maybe Lower Pay, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018),
hupsJMww.nyfima.wmn01W12/06/hnmess/wmomy/mfifichl-mmlfigww-hhinghml
[httpsz/lperma.edV6SV-NDEC].
52. See infra Parts 1.13.1, H.C.
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align with company objectives.” Hence, HR professionals believe that data
analytics can usefully augment the pool of information and produce better
results, ofien by eliminating various forms of bias.” Data analytics
incorporates Al in its use of three different sources of information: job tests,
video-recorded interviews, and videogames.
(1) Job Tests
Paper—and-pencil or, more ofien today, online tests for measuring job-
skill aptitude or personality have existed for decades. So long as they don’t
ask personal questions or reflect discemibly biased assumptions, such tests
are relatively uncontroversial.” What’s new today, however, is the ability of
AI to match applicants’ scores on such tests—or even their answers to
particular questions—to theirjob perfonnance down the road, and then to use
the resulting data to predict the performance of other fiiture applicants.“
Labor economists Mitchell Hoffman, Lisa Kahn, and Danielle Li studied
hiring at fifieen companies that employed workers in the same low-skilled
service sector.” They compared companies that relied primarily on testing
and data analytics with those that simply relied on job interviews. They found
that:
cohorts of workers hired with job testing have substantially longer tenures
than cohorts ofworkers hired without testing, holding constant a variety of
time-varying location and random variables. In our setting, job tenure is a key
measure of quality because turnover is costly and workers already spend a
substantial fraction oftheir tenure in paid training. This finding suggests that
this job test contains useful information about the quality ofcandidates.”
Specifically, their study found that managers who relied primarily on
objective test results achieved a fifteen percent increase in tenure as
compared to the managers who did not.” When discretion was removed
entirely and hiring corresponded exclusively to the test results, tenure
increased further.‘° They conclude from this that “[o]ur results are broadly
aligned with findings in psychology and behavioral economics that
53. See Mitdiell Hoffman et al., Discretion In Hiring, [l33, ISSUE 2] Q.J. ECON. 765, 765 (2018).
54. Id.; see also Josh Bersin, Blg Data In Human Resources: Talent Analytics (People Analyttm)
Corner of Age, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2013, 8:00 PM),
ht1ps:l/www.forbes.com/tea/joshbersin/201 310W1 7/bigdata-hi-human-resources-talent-analytics
comes-of-age/#7a2dc5dd4ed0 [https'J/penna.ec/JSCR-AJSM].
55. See generally Greenawalt v. Indiana Dep’t ofCorrections, 397 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2005).
56. Sm Mateen, supra note 49.
57. See supra note 53 at 765.
58. Id. at 766.
59. Id. at 769.
60. See, e.g., Id. at 766.
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emphasize the potential of machine-based algorithms to mitigate errors and
biases in hmnan judgement across a variety ofdomains?“
(ii) Video-recorded Interviews
Pre-hire video-recorded interviews recently have become a tool in the
recruiter's toolbox.” In pre-hire video interviews, applicants are asked
questions specifically tailored to the particular open position.“ Candidates
digitally video-record their answers, usually online from home or their
current office, using their desktop or laptop computer. The video is then
transmitted to a company such as HireVue“ that uses A1 to analyze the video.
HireVue uses Al to analyze the applicants’ language patterns, verbal skills,
and emotions“ by, for example, identifying facial expressions, intonation,
gestures, and word choice.“ It then uses its machine learning algorithms to
evaluate the candidates’ work styles, predict their ability to work with others,
and assess general cognitive ability. It uses this information to prioritize
applicants.” HireVue claims to provide such services for over 700
companies,“ including Intel,“ Accenture,7" and Unilever." Another
company that offers services similar to HireVue’s is Cognisess, which
promises to use video analytics to identify microexpressions that reveal a
candidate’s emotions and motivations."
Although employers have used job interviews for centuries to evaluate
an applicant’s personality and cognitive ability on the basis of their body
language and word choice, video-recorded interviews make it possible for
interview data to be stored and analyzed indefinitely. The questions asked in
a video-recorded interview may be indistinguishable from the types of
questions asked in a typical job interview, at least for now. However,
61. Id. at 769.
62. See DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 51; How an Algorithm May Decide Your Career,
THE EOONOMIST (Jun. 21, 2018), Imps://www.economist.comIbusiness/2018/06/21/how-an-algorithm-
may-decide-your-career [lmpsz//pernncc/QPG2-YRTZ]; See also Hire Education, supra note 6.
63. DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 51.
64 HIREVUE, Imps:/Iwww.hirevue.coml [httpsv/peuna.ecfIW9Q-MDB9] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
65. Pre-Employment Assessmenn, HIREVUE hi1ps://www.hi1evue.eom/prodiicts/assessn1ents/pre-
employment-video-assessments [l1ttps'J/peuna.cc/4CST-XTHG] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
66. See Hiring Education, supra note 6; How an Algorithm May Decide Your Career, supra note
62 (explainingthatsuccessful appficanlsnmintnineyeoomaetwiflifiiecainemflnnuglumtthehnerview,
sound confident, sit up straight, and avoid thrashing gestieulation)
67. HIREVUE, supra note 64.
68. HireVue Video Interviewing Software, HIREVUE, https:l/www.hirevue.com/products/video-
interviewing/ondemand [httpsz//penna.ec/643T-I.AHU] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) .
69. Id.
70. Hire Education, supra note 6.
71. DAUGHEt1'Y&WlLsoN, supra note 5,at51.
72. See Cognisess, A Guide to Video Analytics, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.cognisess.eomIvideo-analytical; hnps://www.youmbe.comlwatch?v=6US6S6eV3Pg
(describing Oognisess‘ sofiware platform) [httpsz//pernn.ec/QY7N-X4NU].
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HireVue’s most significant ability to add value to the job-application process
will come down the road, afier it has tracked the success or failure of the
applicants its clients have hired and used Al to correlate the interview
idiosyncrasies of millions of video-recorded applicants with their success or
failure on the job. HireVue could then use the resulting data to predict the
performance ofnew applicants.
(iii) Video Games”
AI and video games can be used together to screen and sort applicants."
Video games are sometimes used at the early stage of the search process.”
Companies such as Knack," Deloitte," Pymetrics,7" and HireVue7° (through
its acquisition ofMindX) have applicants play a video game for about twenty
minutes, then use the resulting data to analyze the applicants’ risk appetites,
mental agility, persistence,” and ability to read emotional versus contextual
clues.“ For example, “Wasabi Waiter”, designed by Knack, places the job
applicant in the role of a server at a sushi restaurant who must figure out
which dishes to recommend to customers. The designer of the game, Guy
Halfieck, explains:
The player has to engage in multiple micro-decisions, think about
prioritizing, about [the] sequence oftaking actions, about persisting when the
game becomes more challenging . . . The game collects all the data points
about the entirety of the behavior during the game . . . Then we analyze that
data to extract insight into the intellectual and personal makeup of that
person.”
73. PortionsofthissectionhavebeeiiuikarfiomsavagedzBaies,supranote44.Fora
comprehensive discussion of using video games in the applicant-screening process, and the legal
ofthe e, see id.
74. See DAUGI-IERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 51; Hire Education, supra note 6.
75. Hire Education, supra note 6.
76. KNACKAPP, hii;psJ/www.knack.it/ [httpsz//pemis.odF9YJ-7ZI5](1ast visited Nov. 8, 2019).
77. Rob Davies, Everything to Playfor as Employers Turn to Video Gaines in Recruianeni Drive,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2015, 11:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/moneyfzol5/novl28/psychometric-tests-games-iecruitrnent-interview
[httpsz//perma.eclWD3Y-PZVB ].
78. Employers, PYME'l'RlCS, https://www.pyinetrics.eom/employerx/ [htips://perma.cc/L9ZD-
QF6i-I] (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
79. Dan Parker, 7 Things You Need to KnowAboui Game-Based Cognitive Assessments, HIREVUE
(Jul. 12, 2018), mqisz/Mwwhimwm.wmmloy7-mmgs-ywmeed4o-knowabom-gamebasedeogmfive
assessments [httpsz//perma.ccJ46W9-PR4J]
80. Davies, supra note 77.
81. DAUG1-{ERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 51.
82. Could Video Games Be the Nat Job Interview, NA'l10NAL PUBLIC RADIO: ALL TECH
CONSIDERED (Dec. 1, 2013, 8:13 AM),
http://www.npr.orysections/a11techeonsideredI2013/12/01/246999632lplaying-the—game-to-get-the-job
[1mps://perma.ec/57NK-N611].
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Even one law firm is getting in on the action: in late 2018, O’Melveny
& Myers began using cognitive-testing video games to assess law students
for legal employment.” Using video games in hiring raises legal concerns
involving the possibility of subtle discrimination; this is explored below.
2. Performance, Pay, & Promotions
Afier a company uses Al to hire an employee, it may use Al to track
performance, determine pay, and make decisions about promotions and/or
dismissal. For example, the data management company Workday“ provides
a comprehensive “people analytics” product to analyze workforce
demographics, monitor turnover trends, and track performance.” According
to its website, Workday boasts that it offers companies the ability to: “[m]ake
better recruiting decisions with quality-of-hire metrics,” “[g]et a complete
view of your people and operations” and “detect patterns that you might not
see or have time to discover.”“ Workday claims it can examine some sixty
factors—such as time an employee takes between days off for vacations,
changes in an individual’s supervisor, and other seemingly innocuous
considerations—to predict which employees are likely to quit, which ones
are likely to be disgruntled, and how the employer might retain the best
employees.”
Another company, Arena," which focuses on the healthcare industry,
uses information from job applications and third parties to predict which
applicants are likely to stay for more than a year. Twine Labs” tracks
“hundreds of variables” which it uses to recommend internal candidates for
promotion.” Infosys is considering using Al to identify employees for raises
based on their performance and their pay relative to peers.“
83. 0’Me1veny Could Se: Trend with Law Student Cognitive Testitg, Bwomaeao Law (Nov. 23,
2018, 3:01 AM), htlpJ/newsbloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/omelveny-could-set-trend-with-
law-student-cognitive-testing. Thanks to Laura Cooer for calling our attention to this news article.
84. Reporting and Analytics, WORKDAY, ht1psM/www.workday.com/en-us/applications/huInan-
capital-managemait/people-analyt.ics.htrnl [httpsz//perma.cc/LU7H-[CM] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Hire Education, supra note 6.
88. ARENA, https:I/www.aienasolutions.eom/ [httpsz//perma.od9J7Z-ZF8S] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
89. TWINE, htlpsJ/www.twinelabs.com/ [https://perma.cdYC6Y-7!-1N6] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
90. Hire Education, supra note 6.
91. Id. Ontheotherside ofthe specnumale gig-economycompanies like Uberthathave etfectively
outsolnoed worker assessment to customels. See User-ratingsyxtenls are Cut-rate Substitute:fora Sldtfitl
Boss, THE ECoNoMlsr (Jun. 30, 2018), https:/lwww.econoinist.comlfinance-and-
wmomicsn0l8I06B0msa-mflngaystemsaman-mm-nmsfimms-for-a4Hlfid-boss
[httpsz//penna.ccJAXP9-DSB5]. These companies typically rely on a “star” system, when customers rate
the worker on a scale of, for exanple, one to live. Five-star workers may get more work assignments; one-
starworkas mayget“fited". Somescholars havearguedthatheseratingsystemscanbe taintedwith
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At companies using Al to perform employee assessment, the role of
managers and supervisors is likely to change significantly. For example,
technical supervision (ensuring that a worker is doing her job properly) and
disciplinary supervision (ensuring that an employee is behaving
appropriately in the workplace) may be performed by different supervisors,
or may be divided among several supervisors using several sets of
algorithms.” Moreover, the authority to give technical instruction may be
delegated to individuals who are not employed by the same company or even
in the same country.” Disaggregation and outsourcing will permit more
specialized supervision and facilitate cross—company activities and standard-
setting. However, they also can facilitate HR collusion and illegal
blackballing, thereby generating potential antitrust and collusion concerns,
which will be discussed below.
C. Electronic Surveillance
Data is the life blood ofAI. Indeed, in the workplace, AI is inseparable
from the technology used to collect data. AI algorithms are built from troves
ofdata that a computer amasses, organizes, and analyzes to predict outcomes
and achieve a stated goal. The goal of HR AI—or “people analytics,” as it is
ofien terrned—is an efficient, safe, productive, and effective operation. AI
uses historical data from one or more workplaces to set a baseline and identify
patterns. It then uses data about ongoing operations to draw comparisons,
identify deviations, and make predictions. Hence, employers need to collect
data about their employees in order to develop, implement, and utilize Al.
They do this by means of electronic monitoring and surveillance. However,
current monitoring and surveillance technology has the potential to facilitate
a massive intrusion into employee privacy inside and outside of the
workplace, and raises a host of other legal concerns, which will be explored
in Part 11, below.“ In this section, we describe some of the methods and
capabilities of AI linked electronic surveillance.
1. New Types ofElectronic Surveillance
Labor historians have extensively documented employers’ use of
company spies and thugs to identify and brutalize union organizers. One such
bias. For exanple, ifMuslim drivers receive consistently lower ratings than white drivers, Muslim drivers
willbeatfectedinveryrealandquantifiableways. Customermtingsystenm,andtheissuestheyraise,are
not limited to gig-economy companies, as an increasing number ofconventional companies are following
suit. See User-rating system, supra.
92. See IBA, supra note 7, at 50 51.
93. Id.
94. Inadditiontotlrehborlawissuesdiscussedinthissecfion,fl1euseofAIinmeworkplacecan
also implicate violations of privacy, collusion and black-listing, each of which are
discussed in separate sections.
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example is the Ford Motor Company’s use of its Sociology Department to
invade workers’ homes to forage for evidence ofunion activity.” Today, Al
and electronic monitoring enable employers to engage in worker surveillance
in ways that are arguably more effective.
Electronic surveillance and monitoring is ubiquitous, invisible, and
perpetual. For example, the company Slack” uses Al to assess how quickly
workers accomplish each task and to monitor workers who might be dozing
or misbehaving.” The company Cogito” uses Alto listen to customer-service
calls and grade workers on empathy and how quickly and effectively they
solve complaints.” Microsoft’s MyAnaly1:ics‘°° amalgamates data from a
worker’s emails, calendars, and phones to calculate how the worker spends
her time, how ofien she is in touch with key contacts, and whether she
multitasks too frequently.'°' The company Veriatom has produced sofiware
that registers everything that happens on a worker’s keyboard; it can flagpoor
productivity, misconduct (such as stealing company records), and negative
attitudes.'°3 The company KeenCorp‘°‘ analyzes an employee’s emails,
focusing on word patterns and content, and then assigns each employee a
number reflecting the employee’s level of engagement: a high number
95. Thereisavastliteratureaboiittheuseofspiesandthugsbyeniployersthmughthelate19"'and
20"‘ century to intimidate union supporters and prevt unionization. For some recent contributions, see,
e.g., ROBERT M. SMl'I'H, FROM BLACKJACKS TO BRIEFCASESZ A HISIDRY 01-‘ COMMERCIALIZED
STIUKEBREAKJNG AND UNION BUSITNG IN THE UNITED STATE 75 97 (2003) (documenting extent of,
and tactics of, spies and labor spy agencies by U.S. employers from the early 20"‘ century); S. PAUL
O'HARA, INVEN'l'lNG THE PINKERTONS; OR, SPIES, SLEUTHS, MERCENARJES, AND THUGS (2016); accord
STEPHEN H. Nonwooo, S'11uKEEREAx|NG AND INTIMIDATION: MERCENARIES AND MAsCULINrrY IN
TwEN'nEm CENTURY AMHUCA 175 178 (2002) (on use of ‘plug uglies’ and other thugs to spy on and
pm-union workers in Ford Motor Company's River Rouge plant in the 19203 and 1930s);
Michael Ballaban, When Henry Fordk Benevolent Secret Police Ihdedflis Workers, JALOPNIK (Mar. 23,
2014, 1:35 PM), ht1ps:/[|alopnik.com/when-henry-fords-benevolent-secreI:-police-n1led-his-wo-
1549625731 [httpsz/lperma.ccl4NA5 76EL] (describing Ford's Sociology Dqaartment and its intrusions
into the homes ofFord workers).
96. SLACK, https://slack.com/ [lmps'J/perma.cc/389U-NH64] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
97. AI-Spy, supra note 6, at 13.
98. COGITO, htIp'J/www.cogitocorp.com/ [https://pernn.cc/ X4QK-ZD66] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
99. Id.; see also Custamerservice CouldStart Living Up to in Name, THE EooNoM1sr (March 28,
2018), httpsz//www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/28/customer-savic&could-start-living-up-to-
its-name [httpsJIpemia.cclDC1(7-WBDN].
100. Mlcmsofi Mymlalyucs, MICROSOFT, hltps:/Ipmducts.office.com/en-uslbusinesslmyanalyticy
personal-analytics (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) [htips'J/pa'ma.cc/N3TA-H95C].
101. There WIl!BeLtttle Privacy In the Workplace ofthe Future, THE ECONOMISI‘ (Mar. 31, 2018),
https://www.economist.comlspecial-report/2018/03/28/there-will-be-little-privacy-in-the-workplace-of?
the-fimue [https:lIpernn.cc/Y9WX-XMTV].
102. VERIATO, https://www.veriato.com/ [httpsz//perma.cc/WXK7-KAI-lD] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
103. There W1llBe I1ttIePrtvat.y, supra note 10].
104. KEENCORP, http://www.keencorp.com/ [httpsz//permacc/Q7QP-A7PE] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
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indicates an employee feeling positive and engaged, a low number an
employee feeling disengaged and expressing negative emotions.’°5 The
company Teramind‘°‘ sends workers pop-up warnings if it suspects they are
slacking or about to share confidential documents.'°7 Some white collar
workplaces have installed a system called OccupEye,'°‘ in which sensors on
employees chairs indicate how often an employee is at her desk and how long
she is on breaks.‘°° Many employers install GPS devices on employees’
phones as well as vehicles that can track their employees’ every movements,
both on and ofl‘ the job."°
Employers are beginning to require employees to don wearable tracking
devices.'” For example, Ultrasonic"2 wristbands issued by Amazon track
workers’ precise locations and hand movements, gauging workers’
productivity and accuracy and vibrating to nudge workers into being more
efficient.‘ '3 Other employers require their employees to wear Fitbits that can
monitor and provide employers with information about employees’ heart
rates, blood pressure, and sleep pattemsf“ In 2018, Amazon patented a
“haptic wristband” that observes employees’ every movement, including
quirks, fidgets, and bathroom breaks."5 Another electronic wristband
105. Frank Partnoy, The Secrets In Your Inbax, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018),
https://www.theat|anfic.com/magazine/archivd2018/09/me-secrets-' -your-inbox/565745/
[httpsz//perma.ec/Y7DP-CWSV]. (noting that “heat naps”, created by aggregating employees’
engaget numbers by department or can ostensibly be used to flag when something has
stndarlygonemmgmmmdeparnnentordivisiommchasmneompfimeewimgovtrulesor
sexual harassment).
106. TERAMIND, https://www.teramind.co [httpsz//perrna.cc/V3TR-LGR5] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019).
107. Miranda Katz, The Creative Ways your Boss is Spying on You, WIRED (Aug. 12, 2018, 7:00
AM), https://www.wir'ed.oom/story/the—creative-ways-yoIn'-boss-is-spying-on-you/
[https://perma.cc/3DTF-BCNG].
108. OCCUPEYE, httpszl/www.occupeye.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) [1rttps://perma.cc/7BQV-
VFKH].
109. Ryan Demusseau , The Tech That Ducks Your Movements at Work, BBC Ryan Deroussean,
The Tech That Tracks Your Movements at Work, BBC WORKLII-‘E (June 14, 2017),
http://www.bbe.corn/capital/storyI20170613-the-tech-that-tracks-your-movems-at-work
[httpsc//perma.ec/9'I'RF-TA7X].
110. See, e.g., Kaveh Waddell, Why Basses Can Duck Thetr Employees 24/7, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
6, 2017), https:/lwww.theatlantic.eom/technology/archive/2017/01/errrploya-gps-tracking/512294]
[https://perma.ccIP3SZ-DYZU].
111. See lfeorna Ajunwa, Algortthnrs at Work: Productivity Monttortng Applications and Wearable
Technology, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L). 21, 34 41 (2019) (providing an overview ofcurrently used and pending
wearable surveillance devices).
112. Katz, supra note 107.
113. A1-spy, supra note 6; There Millie Llttle Privacy, supra note 101.
114. See, eg., Sunnne McGee, How Employers Tracking Your Healm Can Cross The Line And
Become Big Brother, ‘I1-[E GUARDIAN (May 1, 2015, 8:30 AM),
https://www.tIregtrardian.conr/lifeandstyle/us-money-blog/2015/nuy/01/employers-tracking-healtm
fithit-apple-watch-big-brother [htlpsz/lperma.cc/9562 TU63].
115. Ajunwn, supra note 111, at 34; see also Ceylan Yeginsu, U’Workenr Slackofi,’ the Wristband
Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for It), N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018)
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measures employees’ moods. “Smart glasses” improve peripheral or low
light vision—but also enable an employer to see whatever an employee sees,
as if looking through their eyes."‘ There are patents pending for biofeedback
clothing, such as a vests and exoskeletons that monitor heart rates, stress
levels, and other physiological and psychological states.'” Some employers
are requiring employees to wear caps and headbands that measure brain
activity and detect fatigue levels. ' “' IBM and Hyundai have utilized wearable
technology such as bionic bodysuits and exoskeletons to enhance some
employees’ strength"’ and guide their movements—garb that also provides
employers with detailed information about employees’ biological,
physiological, and emotional conditions.'2°
Companies have also updated the classic employee badge into a
monitoring device. The company I-Iumanyzem requires its employees to
wear an ID badge containing a microphone that records conversations, a
Bluetooth and infrared sensor that monitors where they are (how long do they
spend in the break room? Outside the building smoking?), and an
accelerometer that notes when they move.'” The company’s sofiware
collects data on how much time each worker spends with talking with people
and the proportion of time spent speaking versus listening.'23 According to
Richard Reice, writing for Bloomberg Law:
[Humanyze’s] employee ID badges . . . incorporate biometric measuring
capabilities that track movements and interactions in the office, including the
length ofconversations and voice tones via built-in microphones. Referred to
as “people analytics,” [Humanyze boasts that] these devices can help
companies understand how their employees interact and move about the
office which, among other things, can lead to a better-designed workplace,
adjustment ofmodule workplaces around project teams, or—more simply-
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In a similar vein, Hitachi has created the “Business Microscope,” a
device affixed to a lanyard that serves as a security badge and key but also
enables the company to know which workers are interacting with which
others by means of a signal sent when two badge-wearing people are in
proximity?” This technology tells the company how often a worker talks to
coworkers, how energetic and animated the conversation is, and whether the
employee is an active participant in meetings or group conversations.“
Presumably the technology also has the capacity to record, and store, actual
conversations.'"
One new frontier in the burgeoning field of people analytics is
monitoring workers’ emotional states and shaping their behaviors. '23 An MIT
research team headed by finance professor Andrew Lo concluded, on the
basis of simulated experiments, that emotionally stable and resilient workers
perform better in stressfill situations than those who are easily riled. As a
result, they are developing wearable wristwatches and badges that have
sensors to monitorworkers’ emotional states. ‘Z9 Several banks and brokerage
firms have adopted these devices.'3°
Perhaps the most insidious monitoring technology is Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID). RFID allows employers to track microchips attached
to workers and goods using radio waves. It can also be implanted under
employees’ skin for identification and access to facilities. For example,
Swedish company Biohax International makes an implantable RFID chip
housed inside a bioglass capsule smaller than a gel aspirin tab, which is
injected into the web of an employee’s skin between their thumb and
forefinger. The capsule uses near-field communication (NFC) to
communicate with enabled devices.” RFID is touted for its eficiency-
enhancing properties. As one commentator explains, “Once the capsule is
injected, an employee need only place his or her band in near proximity to an
125. See, e.g., ‘Business Microscope’ to Track EnpIoyee.r'Every Move at Warlqilace, THE HINDU
BUSINESS LINE (Mar. 10, 2018), httpsJ/www.fl1ehindubusinesshne.com/news/husinem-micmscope4o-
track-employees-every-move-at-workplnceJarticle20723763.ece [hltpszl/penna.cc/2ZJH-A962].
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127. For a description of these and other emergent wearable monitoring technologies, see Ajlmwa,
supra note 1 I l.
128. For examples of how electronic wearable technology can be used to monitor employee
emotional states and alterployee decisions and behavior, see Timothy L. Fort et al., The Angel on Your
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& INTEL. PROP. 139, 148 153 (2016).
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NFC-enabled door, computer, vending machine, photocopier, or other device
to gain entry, record a purchase, or authorize access.””’ RFID can also be
used to give employers ongoing information about workers’ location,
conversations, physiological state, psychological condition, and more.“
To be sure, some Al-enabled monitoring is benign or even constructive.
Computer vision enhanced with AI can ensure workers do not enter
dangerous work areas without safety equipment like hard hats and gloves and
can monitor the factory floor for signs of danger.” Wearable vests and
“exoskeletons” can enable workers to perform arduous physical tasks more
safely. For example, Ekso Works Industrial Exoskeleton, created by Ekso
Bionics, is a bionic suit that enables the wearer to lifi heavy tools as if they
weighed nothing at all.'” Similar devices enable workers with restricted
mobility to perform heavy lifiing.'3° However, as described below, many
aspects ofAI—enabled workplace monitoring threaten to suppress opposition,
punish union supporters, and otherwise undermine workers’ rights?”
2. Monitoring 0171Work Activity
In addition to monitoring on-duty conduct, AI enables employers to
monitor off-duty (particularly online) conduct continuously and extensively.
Today, employers typically review an applicant’s publicly available social
media accounts before a hiring decision is made” to determine whether the
applicant’s social media history should disqualify her fiom being hired!”
Current employees ofien are fired for inappropriate social media posts or
tweets."° So far, such firings do not usually result fi'om an employer’s
pervasive monitoring of employees’ social media accounts,"' but instead
132. Id.
133. For an example ofone offlre mny companies providing such products, see Employee Tracking
& Visitor Monitoring .S)vstem from Long Range, LiTUMlcrr, htlps://liunniotoom/employee-people-
tracking! [httpsz//perma.cd8ZAM-PZFZ].
134. See There WillBe Little Privacy, supra note 102; AI-spy, supra note 6.
135. See Eks-oWorks, EKSO BIONICS, httpszlldrsobionicseornleksoworksl [hnpsv/permaec/T6W8
4FAF].
136. Ajrmwa, supra note 111, at 28 (citing Adam Rogers, We Try a New Exaskeleion for
Construction Workers, WIRED (Apr. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM), 1mps'J/www.wired.oomR015/04/lry-new-
exoskeleton-cxmstruction-wmkerv [httpsz//pernn.cr'/624V-1-IYLA]).
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138. See Kathleen M. 1-lidy & Mary S. E. McDonald, Risky Businas: The lnrplioations ofSocial
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Kmsabian, Enplayees 'Privacy in the Iniane:Age: Towards aNew ProceduralApproach, 40 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 215 (2019).
139. See Terry M. Dworkin, Protecting Private Emplayeesfiom Enhanced Monitoring: Legislative
Approaches, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 59, 75 (1990); Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the Fourth Amendment:
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from a “friend” or co-worker alerting management about the ofi°ensive posts
or tweets of fellow employees.” This is because few employers have the
time or inclination to pervasively monitor their employees’ social media
accounts. However, emerging AI applications that can engage in wide,
perpetual sweeps of social media will change the frequency and penetration
of employer social media eavesdropping. Companies now can use Al to
comprehensively monitor an employee’s on-duty work communications and
ofi'—duty social media communications.”
Employers have some legitimate reasons to use A] to monitor
employees’ off-duty and on-line conduct. Racist or sexist posts may indicate
a proclivity to racist or sexist conduct or harassment in the workplace.
Aggressive posts may indicate a bullying personality. A post containing the
company’s name and words or phrases like “gun” or shoot” or “blow up”
could be a red flag for impending workplace violence. Posts indicating illegal
drug use or overconsumption of alcohol could raise workplace safety
concerns. Posts disparaging the company or its products could harm the
company’s reputation. Indeed, the ease ofconducting such monitoring using
AI technology, coupled with the potential liability for wrongfirl hiring” or
retention or failing to prevent harassment or violence, may begin to nudge
more and more employers to comprehensively monitor their employees’
social media accounts."5 The more they do, however, the more serious the
privacy concerns become.
3. Data Retention and Use
Technology not only creates the potential for highly intrusive
monitoring, but also raises questions about how employers will use the data
they collect about employees’ performance, with whom they will share it,
and how long they will keep it. AI-enhanced data collection, retention, and
analytic capabilities threaten to create a permanent record of employee
productivity, activity, and medical and physiological attributes. Some
companies claim that AI-amassed data will be collected only in the aggregate,
rather than on individual workers, in order to provide dashboard analytics
Enployen” Requestsjbr Pas.s'wondDr'scIas1ae, 14 J. HIGH TECH. LJ. 42 (2014). However, this does not
appear to be the norm.
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that enable managers to monitor the performance ofgroups and divisions.”
In Europe, data protection laws restrict the collection of individualized
data. "7 However, there are no comparable restrictions in the US, and services
offered by companies such as Workday, Arena, and Twine Labs indicate they
already are collecting and using individualized assessment data. "3 Below we
discuss the discrimination, privacy, antitrust, and labor law issues that can
arise fi-om today’s data collection and retention practices.”
II. LEGAL ISSUES STEMMING FROM AI IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Employment Discrimination
Several legal scholars have warned about the danger of AI entrenching
discrimination and bias into firm-level HR practices. They argue that Al can
amplify or mask discriminatory prejudices and disproportionately exclude
underrepresented groups ofworkers. "° Defenders ofthe use ofAl in HR, on
the other hand, argue that it has the potential to reduce discrimination by
minimizing or eliminating human judgment, and by identifying hiring
practices that are unintentionally exclusionary."' While both effects are
plausible, it is clear, at the least, that the use of AI in the workplace raises
serious concerns that as of yet are largely unaddressed by existing anti-
discrimination law.
AI can operate at several stages in the work relationship, including
hiring, wage setting, evaluation, promotion, discipline, and dismissal. If
algorithms are constructed that embody insidious racial or gender
stereotypes, then women or people of color will be seriously disadvantaged
in the labor market. The same would occur from the use of stereotypes
concerning age, disability, religion, or other protected classes. Yet if it is an
algorithm that is producing the discriminatory outcome, rather than a human
decision maker, it may be nearly impossible for the worker who is adversely
affected to mount a successfiil legal challenge.
146. See IBA, supra note 7, at 102; There WIllBe Little Privacy, supra note 101.
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1. How A] Can Generate Bias
There are numerous ways in which AI can introduce bias into the hiring,
evaluation, compensation, and disciplinary processes. First, as the ofi-
observed maxim states, with computer programs, it is “garbage in, garbage
out.” Similarly, with algorithms, it is “bias in, bias out.”"2 If the individuals
providing the search criteria or inputting data, or the programmers creating
the algorithm, are themselves biased, that bias could easily infect the
algorithm. The output likely will then reflect (or even amplify) the same bias.
For example, algorithms analyzing video-recorded interviews might
disproportionately disadvantage certain groups of applicants based on race,
ethnicity, geographic origin, or socio-econornic background by flagging
certain culturally specific voice intonations, speech patterns, or hand
gestures.
More subtly, the creators of algorithms tend to rely on an employer’s
past hiring data to build predictive formulas.'53 Companies want to replicate
their best workers, so they will use algorithms that statistically match job
applicants with these workers. If a company does not have a history ofhiring
a certain class or classification of individuals, the algorithms that are built
using past hiring data will systematically exclude these individuals fi'om
consideration for future open positions. For example, if a fire department is
comprised almost exclusively of men, past hiring data might emphasize the
importance of physical prowess relative to endurance. Likewise, Silicon
Valley has long been criticized for its white-male-dominated workplaces;'5‘
a hiring algorithm based on current workplace demographics likely will
replicate and entrench past hiring practices.‘55 Similarly, using AI in hiring
can result in “classification bias,” which Pauline Kim defines as “the use of
classification schemes that have the effect of exacerbating inequality or
disadvantage along the lines of race, sex or other protected category.”"‘ For
example, many online platforms, such as Facebook, permit advertisers—and
job recruiters—to target a demographically restricted audience based on their
interests, preferences, and characteristics, including age, sex, ethnicity, and
race.'57 Though this type of algorithmic bias is usually treated as under a
152. DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 121; see also Clnrles A. Sullivan, EInployingA1, 63
VIu.. L. REV. 395 (2018).
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theory of disparate impact, Stephanie Bomstein has argued that if the model
“best worker” upon which an algorithm is predicated is based on
discriminatory stereotypes (such as the stereotypes at issue in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins”), the resulting algorithm could give rise to a theory
of disparate treatment discrirnination.'5°
Moreover, using Al in hiring can replicate or amplify real prejudices that
already exist in society.‘°° For example, a study by Latanya Sweeney, former
chief technology ofiicer for the United States Federal Trade Commission,
found that when a Google search is performed on a person’s name, Google
AdSense is much more likely to generate ads that suggest an arrest record for
persons with typical African-American names (DeShawn, Darnell, Jermaine)
than for those with typical non-Hispanic white names (Geoffrey, Jill,
Emma).'°' The mere suggestion of the possibility of an arrest record, even if
no such record exists, could subconsciously persuade a hiring manager to
choose the “less risky” candidate.”
Moreover, algorithms that adopt facially neutral criteria can nonetheless
create bias in operation. For example, in one study, business school
professors Anja Larnbrecht and Catherine Tucker placed ads for jobs in
STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) subjects."3 They found
that Facebook was significantly more likely to show such ads to men than to
women. This was not because of conscious bias on the part of Facebook
algorithm writers. It occurred because women, who control a high proportion
of household spending, are a more valuable demographic than men,'“
making ads targeting women more expensive. As a result, the algorithm
targeted the ads toward men, where the return on investment would be higher.
They conclude that “[a]n algorithm which simply optimizes cost-
effectiveness in ad delivery will deliver ads that were intended to be gender-
neutral in an apparently discriminatory way, due to crowding out."5
A recent article in Reuters showed how A] can create bias in the hiring
process even when no individual decision maker is operating from covert or
I58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U S. 228 (1989).
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implicit bias.'“ The researchers studied a hiring spree by Amazon in 2015,
when it announced plans to increase its workforce by more than 50,000
people nation-wide. To do this, Amazon developed an algorithm to screen
the avalanche of resumes it anticipated receiving. The algorithm was based
on patterns observed in previous hiring over the previous ten years, a baseline
during which the oompany’s hiring was overwhelmingly male. As a result,
“Amazon’s system taught itself that male candidates were preferable. It
penalized resumes that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess
club captain.’ And it downgraded graduates of two all-women’s colleges,
according to people familiar with the matter.”‘°7 In addition, the algorithm
“favored candidates who described themselves using verbs more commonly
found on male engineers’ resumes, such as ‘executed’ and ‘captured.’’’ '“
Similarly, using a video game to screen applications may disadvantage
older applicants because, as a group, older applicants do not perform as well
on the games as younger applicants do."°
These potential sources of bias raise the specter of disparate impact
discrimination.”° Disparate impact discrimination occurs when a facially
neutral hiring criterion, such as success in a video game “interview,” has the
166. Jeflrey Dustin, Amazon Scraps Seem AI Recruiting Tool that Slowed Bias Against Women,
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unintended efiect of disproportionately excluding members of a protected
classification such as race,”' sex,'72 or age."3 To prevail, a person claiming
disparate impact discrimination must point to a specific employment practice
that causes the discriminatory impact—which, as described below,"‘ may be
difiiwlt if the particular practice is buried in the “black box”"5 of an
algorithm If the person can show that the elements of the employer’s
decision-making process cannot be separated out for analysis, the entire
decision-making process (presumably, the output of the algorithm) may be
analyzed so it may become difficult for a plaintiff to isolate a specific
discriminatory practice (unless courts pennit plaintiffs to show the algorithm
as a whole produced the impact).'7° Under established precedent, once
discriminatory impact is shown by an employee, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer, who must show the employment criterion is job-
related—in other words, that the characteristics screened for on a job test or
video-recorded interview or video game correlate with success on the job.
The employer must also show that it is a business necessity—that the
characteristics screened for are important for the business, and not merely of
peripheral concern.‘"
The use of AI may make the employee’s burden ofproof difficult. An
employee is not only at a disadvantage in identifying bias when that bias is
embedded in a hiring algorithm using dozens of factors and shrouded in code,
but also has scant ability to penetrate an employer’s claim ofjob-relatedness
and business necessity to contest whether the claim is justified.”‘ Thus, for
example, if a job candidate believes that an employer’s facially neutral job
screening criteria are inherently biased and thus have a discriminatory
impact, it is very possible that neither the employer nor the plaintifl‘s
attorney has any idea—and no way of finding out—what criteria the
algorithm taught itself to use, where it got those criteria, and why it “chose”
to use those criteria. An Al algorithm is not like a typical computer program,
where an employer might tell the computer to weed out all applicants who
don’t have an engineering degree, didn’t graduate from a top-100 school, and
didn’t have a GPA ofat least 3.0. Instead, the employer tells the algorithm to
identify the best engineers, and then the algorithm uses a vast array of data
171. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
172. Id.
173. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 634 (2012).
174. See Infra Part lI.A.2.
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176. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 8: Trim, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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collected from disparate sources to choose its own variables, to weight those
variables, and sort applicants accordingly. It may not be possible to reverse-
engineer the algorithm’s ‘ ' ' g” process to figure out exactly how or why
it did all this.
2. AI Is a Black Box
One reason that Al poses particularly troubling discrimination concerns
is that each AI algorithm is a practically impenetrable black box. If an
algorithm is producing biased outcomes, it is difficult if not impossible to
“drill down” into the algorithm to find out what is producing the bias and
how to fix it.'” The complexity and obscurity of the algorithm poses
problems for identifying and fixing bias, as well as for any litigation that
results from discriminatory hiring decisions based on the algorithm. In
litigation, if it is not possible to discover exactly how the algorithm is
producing bias, then a disparate impact analysis must be used to analyze the
algorithm as a unitary whole for purposes ofascertaining discrimination.”
This is not to say that the same problems do not occur in the absence of
AI. It is also difficult to identify bias when discrimination results from human
beings sorting through thousands ofresumes, using ad hoc or vague selection
criteria."" Human minds oflen are as inaccessible as algorithmic black boxes,
and absent objective or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,
identifying precisely how or why an HR oflicer’s review of resumes results
in discrimination can be every bit as elusive as discovering the cause of
discrimination in an algorithm. Nonetheless, the inscrutability ofalgorithmic
personnel decisions changes the way disparate impact cases are analyzed.“
A disparate impact challenge to the use of AI in hiring would have to
begin by assessing the result and showing that the use of AI has produced a
result that is disadvantageous for applicants on the basis of their race, sex,
age, disability, or some other protected characteristic.” Plaintiffs should be
required to show only that an algorithm as a whole caused a disparate impact;
they should not be expected to show precisely how the algorithm produced
the bias.
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If a plaintiffmakes this showing, then the burden should be squarely on
the employer to reverse-engineer the algorithm, explain how it made its
hiring recommendations, and demonstrate that each factor going into the
recommendation is consistent with business necessity. An Al savvy sofiware
engineer may be needed to create a hypothesis about what might be causing
the differences, provide the algorithm with different data to test the
hypothesis, and compare the resulting predictions.'“
3. AI ’s Potential to Reduce Bias
Though AI has the potential to create bias, it also has the potential to
reduce it, in several ways. First, AI can be used to the role of
humans in the hiring process, and thus can eliminate or reduce the tendency
of humans to hire the applicants who most resemble themselves.” That is,
Al potentially can function much like a screen in a musician’s orchestral
audition that hides the gender of the candidates, thereby taking gender out of
the process and resulting in a larger proportion of women hired."‘° AI
provides a virtual screen that could reduce the number of opportunities for
bias to leak into the hiring process."7
Similarly, AI can reduce or eliminate unconscious bias. Unconscious
bias can infect the traditional hiring process both because human interviewers
tend to prefer applicants most like themselves, and because humans often
make unconscious assumptions about differences in abilities—such as that
men perform better than women on mathematical tasks.“ By reducing or
eliminating the human role in the hiring process, the opportunities for
unconscious discrimination to infect the process should be reduced
commensurately."‘°
Third, AI can reduce bias by making it possible to identify and eliminate
hiring practices that appear neutral but have an exclusionary impact. For
184. See id. at 197 98.
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interrelation ofdiscrimination and privacy in an era ofAI).
187. I-lire Education, supra note 6.
188. Shana Iebowitz, 3 Unconscious Biases tlraiAfl‘ec! Whether You Get Hired, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jul. 17, 2015, 11:47 AM), mtp1/www.bminessmsider.eommnoonscims-biases-m-hinng-decisions-
2015 7 [httpsz//permacc/2W7S-2992].
189. Don Peck, They ‘re Watching You at Work, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013),
http://www.tl1eatlantic.com/nmgazineIan:hiveI2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/3S4681/
[lmpsz//perma.oc/MBR4-T4KP].
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example, the company Textio uses Al to improve job descriptions.'°° It found
that ajob description for a position that is said to involve “developing” a team
draws more female applicants than one described as involving ‘&nanaging” a
team.'°' Similarly, AI can flag race- or sex-based differences in pay, and may
even be able to find evidence of harassment or discrimination that human
managers have overlooked.”
Any salutary effect of AI will be for naught, however, if the AI hiring
algorithm is itself infected by bias, either from the programmers themselves
or fi'om the use oftainted input data, as described above. Two safeguards can
reduce this possibility. First, algorithms created by multiple people with
different backgrounds, perspectives, and biases can help avoid, or identify
and eliminate, biases that might be present if programmers worked
individually.‘°3 Second, it might be possible to design an algorithm that can
identify and eliminate discrimination and grafi it onto the algorithm used in
hiring.‘°‘ However, because discrimination can be subtle and its
manifestations can change over time, any corrective algorithmic would itself
require frequent audits and adjustment.
The above discussion highlights the need for EEOC regulation on
algorithmic hiring. Employers using algorithms in the hiring process should
be legally required to conduct regular audits'” of the algorithm both to
identify the specific data used to train the algorithm and to ensure the
outcome of the algorithm is unbiased.“ Code may need to be re-written—
and an employer should not be able to avoid this obligation if the algorithm
190. Textto Hire, TEXTIO, https'J/textio.com/products/ [httpsz//permacc/MBR4-T4KP] (last visited
Nov. 1 1, 2019).
191. Hlre Education, supra note 6.
192. AI-Spy, supra note 6.
193. Savage & Bales, supra note 44, at 227; Alexander supra note I85.
194. Lauren 1. Young, Computer Scientists Ftnd Bias in Algofltluns, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 21,
2015), hupd/spwhumieee.om/twmawwmwfinymfiwudwnmmer-mimfimsfim-Mash-dgodmm
[httpsz//perma.odXA4R-IEAG].
I95. See AGRAWAL El‘ AL., supra note 5, at 198.
196. Daughertysz Wilson, .rupranote5, at 121; seeKim,Aud!ttngAIgor1thnt.v, supranote l60at 191
(notingthat “the lawpermits the useofauditingtodetectandcorrect firrdiscriminatory bi1s."). At least
one algorithmic auditing firm already exists: see ORCAA, http://www.oneilrisk.oom/
[httpsz//perma.cdV8KZ-DSUV] (website ofcompany that audits for accuracy, bias, and fairness). Note,
however, that third-party auditing of onllne algorithms may be prohibited or restricted by current law,
making it diflicult for academics or researchers to discover bias. See Sandvtg v. Sastons Challenge to
CFAA Prohibition on Uncovering Racial Dtvcrirntnauon Onltne, Am. Civil Ijberties Union (Sat. 12,
2017) https:/lwww.aclu.org/cases/sandvig-v-barr-clnllenge-ctiaa-prohibition-tmcovering-racial-
dimflmmafimmfine?mmrwt=cua/umvig-v-wsshnymaflmgecfiapmmbifimumovemg-mm-
[httpsz//perma.ct'/LSUF-YXKR] (describing challenging the
constihrtionalityofflteComputerFraudandAbuseAct,whichmakesitafederalcrimetoaocema
computerin amannerthat“exceeds authorizedaccess").
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is owned and/or operated by an entity other than the employerm (e.g., the
sex-based job ads on Facebook described above”).
B. Worker Privacy
As discussed above, companies using AI collect immense amounts of
information about employees’ work lives, habits, and dispositions that could
affect their employment prospects for their entire careers. Electronic
surveillance and monitoring raise potential legal issues involving employee
privacy. There are several federal and state statutes as well as common law
doctrines that protect some aspects of employee privacy, but these statutes
(with the notable exception of the California Consumer Privacy Act,
discussed below) were enacted before AI made possible the massive
collection and crunching ofdata that are available to employers today. Thus
they do not address the problem of scale and scope of today’s surveillance
capabilities. '99 Moreover, neither existing statutes nor the common law
require employers to get any form of consent before using Al to monitor
employees (particularly on the job) and their social media use.
The relevant federal statutes are the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA),2°° which includes the Wiretap Act and the Stored
Communications Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.’°' In addition,
twelve states have statutes that outlaw the recording ofconversations without
the consent of all parties?” Moreover, two states require employers to
provide notice of electronic monitoring and twenty-five states provide some
protection for employee social media passwords and personal emails.” Title
I of the EPCA, known as the Wiretap Act2°‘, is of limited applicability to
prevent employer surveillance because it prohibits only the interception of
electronic information, not access to infomiation that has already been
transmitted. Moreover, it does not apply to communications where which one
party has consented. If employers own the email or communications system
197. See Paul I-larpur, Collective Versus Individual Rigirm: The Able Worker and the Promotion of
Precarious Workfor Persons with Dlsabilitia Under Conflicting International law Regimes, 41 LOY.
L.A. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 51, 69 (2018) (discussing the challenges ofgig companies altering software
sourced from other companies).
198. See supra notes 158 160 and accompanying text (disarming how Facebook permits
advertisers including job recruiters to target demographically restricted audiences).
199. See William A. Hubert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must Be
Honat, 12 EMP. RTs. & EMF. PoL‘Y J. 49 (2008); See Robert Sprague, Survey of(Mostly Outdated) Laws
Aflecttng Workplace Monitoring, 93 CHI-KENT L. REV. 21 (2018).
200. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 2511 (2012).
201. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2012).
202. Sprague, supra note 199, at 242 43.
203. Id. at 243.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
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used by employees, the employees may be deemed to have given consent.2°’
The Wiretap Act also does not apply to other forms of monitoring, such as
GPS and electronic wearable devices.
Title II of the EPCA, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), is also
limited in its ability to protect worker privacy.‘°° The SCA protects
individuals’ private communications held in electronic storage by third
parties.2‘" Though the SCA does not explicitly mention social media
accounts, such accounts have been found to fall within the statute’s definition
of electronic storage.” However, social media content that is publicly
available is not likely to not be protected by the SCA, because such content
is not considered “private.”2°° On the other hand, content shared privately—
sent directly to only a select group ofpeople, or posted using privacy settings
that restrict public access—might be protected, such that an employer's
monitoring it would violate the statute.“
However, there is considerable authority weighing against applying the
SCA to social media accounts?" First, there are conflicting views about what
constitutes “electronic storage” for purposes ofthe statute. Some courts have
held that once an email or electronic communication is read, it is no longer
in storage and hence not within the statute.“ Moreover, courts disagree about
the application of the statute's exceptions. For example, in Fraser v.
Nationwide, the Third Circuit held that an employer’s search of an
employee’s email was not a violation of the SCA because the SCA excepts
seizures of email authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or
electronic communications service.”"3 In Fraser, the employer was the entity
providing the electronic communications service through its email servers,
so there was no violation?“
205. Ifoema Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, & Jason Schultz, Liruitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L.
REV. 736, 749 (2017) [hereinafter Limitless Surveillance].
206. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012).
207. Id.
208. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
209. European law may provide workers with more protection than American law. See IBA, supra
note 7, at 110 13.
210. Crispin, 717 F.Supp.2d at 991; Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, No. 06 5754-FSH, 2008
WL 6085437, at *1 2 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008); see also Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Phiguelo &
David Ttnw, Reasonable Expectations ofPriw1cy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications
Act, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 36 (2015); Patricia Sanchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alim Del Riego,
BlurredBoundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. Bus. L1. 63,
83, 87 (2012).
21 1. See generally Limitlas Surveillance, supra note 205, at 749 50.
212. SeeSprague,s-uprunote199,at23,n. 78.
213. 352 F.3d 107, 114 15 (3d. Cir. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(l)(20l2))..
214. Id.
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Employee surveillance has also been challenged as violating the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).2'5 That statute creates civil and
criminal violations for an individual who intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization?" However, the statute has been interpreted to pemiit
employers to access employee electronic information when the data is stored
on the employer’s own computer or network?"
Overall, existing federal laws are weak vehicles for protecting employee
privacy in the face of the multitude ofemployer surveillance and monitoring
tools currently in use?" Moreover, state laws offer little additional
protection. The one possible exception is Califomia Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), which was enacted in 2018 and will become effective on January 1,
2020.2” The CCPA is the first omnibus privacy regulation in the United
States and is modeled after the European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR).”° The CCPA, among other things, gives 8 “consumer a right to
request a business to disclose the categories and specific pieces of personal
information that it collects about the consumer, the categories ofsources from
which that information is collected, the business purposes for collecting or
selling the infonnation, and the categories of 3rd parties with which the
information is sl1a.red.””' It also gives consumers the right to request that
companies delete their personal infomiation, and requires companies
receiving such a request to do so.m Rulemaking by the California Attorney
General’s Office is ongoing as this article is being prepared for publication,”
and it is not yet clear whether or to what extent the CCPA might protect
workers from surveillance and monitoring.
In addition to the privacy concern with surveillance and monitoring,
electronic data collection and AI databases have the potential to create a
permanent electronic resume for individual workers that can be neither
erased not challenged. Whether that occurs depends upon the several legal
issues that are not yet resolved. First, do workers have an ownership interest
215. See, e.g., Owens v. Cigna, 188 F. Supp 3d 790, 793 (ND. 111. 2016).
216. 18 U.S.C §§ 1030(l2)(g), l2(h).
217. See Owens, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 793.
218. Limitless Surveillance, supra note 205, at 748 50.
219. Assem. B. 375, 2017 18 Reg. S. (Cal. 2018),
https://leginfo.1egislature.ca.gov/faces/bilJTextCIient.xhtml?bil1_id=201720180AB375
[httpsz/Ipenna.ec/R6ZY-9LDK].
220. See Andrei Gribalrov, Road to Adequacy: Can Calyornia Apply Under the GDPR?, LAWFARE
(Apr. 22, 2018, 8:30 AM), https:/Mww.hwfimbbg.wm/mad-adequacycm-cafifomiaapply-mda'-gdpr





223. See CCPA Current Rule Making Activity, STATE OF CAL. DEP‘T 01-‘ JUST. OFF. OF THE A1'r'v
GEN, Imps://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/M9'I'D-7TI'M] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
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in data compiled about them? And if so, under what circumstances can they
exclude others from seeing or using it? If not, do they have a right to access
the data? Second, do they have any protection from this data being shared
with others—such as to prospective employers—or does their data travel with
them as a lifetime electronic resume that they can neither see not rebut? And
third, do workers have recourse if their data is incorrect and it is used in an
adverse employment action or is shared with others?
One example illustrates the potential problems. As described above,
HireVue makes and analyzes pre-hire videos to determine and evaluate job
candidates?" Under current U.S. law, HireVue owns the videos——just as
Facebook argues that it owns, or at least has the right to use, the user-
generated data supplied by its users, and just as Google owns the data it has
gathered from online searches on its platform?” If an applicant interviews
for a job through HireVue, can she demand that HireVue delete her video-
recorded interview after the job search is over? The answer would probably
be yes under European data privacy laws,“ but there is no equivalent data
privacy law in the U.S. Instead, HireVue’s Privacy Policies explain that it
collects, retains, and stores information on individual applicants that the
individuals provide voluntarily or that it collects from third party sources or
potential employers?” It also collects data fi'om an applicant’s own devices
or from cookies or other technological tracking devices. HireVue firrther
states that individuals have a right to request that data be deleted, but it does
not guarantee that any such request will be honored?“ Thus, under its
policies, if an individual interviews through HireVue for a second job,
HireVue can access the video fi'om her first application to refine its analysis
ofher. Indeed, it can potentially create an “applicant profile” ofher that will
follow her throughout her life?” It is as yet unknown the extent to which
companies consolidate, pool, and share employee information culled from
224. See supra Part I.B.l.b(ii) (Video-recorded Interviews).
225. See David Lamrus,Faaebooksaysyau 'awn'all thedatayvuposr. Noteven close, sayprlvacy
experts, LA. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), https:/lwww.latimes.com/businessl|amn1s/la-fi-laaims-fiwebook-
cambridge-analytics-privacy-20180320-story hlml [ht1ps:llpenna.oc/X3V5-WP22] (‘Regardless ofwhat
a company's privacy policy may say, it's a certainty that people’s information will be boughtand sold for
commercial or political purposes”)
226. ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 17 provides a “right to be
forgotten” (also known as “data ensure”). Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 0.1. (L 119). It
entitlesapersontorequireanenfityholdingdataonthepemonwemsehis/ha'personaldatx,ceasefiufl1er
disseminationofthedata, andpotentiallyhavethird partieshaltprocessiug ofthedala. Id. Tltecondltions
forerasureincludethedatano longerbeingrelevanttoorlginalpurposes forprocessing (inthiscontext,
interview), ortheperson withdrawing consent Seeld.
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electronic collective sources, but ifthey do, then one bad interview day could
mar an applicant’s job prospects for life.
C. A] and the Antitrust Laws
Ifcompeting companies share information about employees and use that
information to make hiring, discipline, promotion or other decisions, they run
into several potential antitrust issues. The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits
concerted activity that results in an unreasonable restraint of trade.23° It
applies not only to overt price fixing and conspiracies to harm competitors,
but also to activities that affect employees. For example, in Freeman v.
Eastman- Whipstock Inc., the District Court for the Southern District ofTexas
stated that an employee who alleged he had been blackballed had standing
under the antitrust law?“ Similarly, in Quinonez v. National Association of
Security Dealers, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a former employee stated a claim
under the Sherman Act when he alleged he was denied employment “not
because ofany individual consideration ofhis own merits or qualifications,”
but because the finns had agreed among themselves “that they would not
‘pirate’ the others and would deny employment to applicants who had either
been fired or who had been rejected for employment by any other member
firm.a!232
Because AI facilitates information gathering, storage, retention, and
sharing, its use in personnel matters can implicate the antitrust laws. For
example, if several competitors shared AI-gleaned information regarding
employee performance, personal characteristics, social media history,
medical absenteeism, and other such data, this might run afoul ofthe antitrust
laws if done with the intent of using the infomiation to blackball workers
deemed undesirable, or to determine whom to hire and how much to pay
them. Similarly, consider an HR services company that uses Al to conduct
video job interviews of prospective employees, uses data analytics to
construct a personality profile and predict future performance from these
interviews, then sells that information to all companies who pay for its
services. This too could be an unlawfiil restraint of trade. These and other
similar scenarios are explored below.
230. “Every contract, combination in the fonn of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
tradeorcommereearnongtlie several Slates, orwith foreignnatious, ishereby declaredtobe illegal.” 15
U.S.C. §1 (2012).
231. 471 F.2d 685, 689 (SD. Tex. 1975). The court stated that “a phintitf [has] standing under the
antitrust laws to allege and challenge a conspiracy of two or more euyloyers attempting to prevent one’s
employment in an industry, where those conspinnors have the power to enforce their conspiratorial
decision. Id. at 689 90, citing Radoviclr v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957); see also F.S. Tinio,
Annotation, Validity Under the Federal Antitrust laws (15 U.S.C.A. §§ I et seq.) ofAgreements Between
Employers or Employer Associations Imposing Ratrlctions on Employment, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 839 (1969).
232. 540 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1976).
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1. Application ofthe Antitrust Laws to Collaboration Between Employers
As discussed above, the antitrust laws apply to restraints on competition
by employers for their personnel practices?” If employers use shared
employee information amassed through AI and electronic surveillance to set
compensation, engage in a no-raiding agreement, or blacklist an employee,
they could face significant antitrust implications.23‘
In this section, we will discuss the antitrust issues posed by using AI in
personnel management to facilitate collaborations among competitors in
general, including issues arising from exchanges of salary and benefit
information or other Al-gleaned employee information. In the next section,
we consider boycotts ofparticular employees and the legality ofno-poaching
agreements in the AI setting.
2. Collaboration Among Competitors
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s AN'I'I'I'RUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATION AMONG COMPE'I'lTORS state that a competitor
collaboration “comprises a set ofone or more agreements, other than merger
agreements, between or among competitors to engage in economic activity,
and the economic activity resulting therefi'om.”235 Competitors are permitted
to collaborate on matters of research and development, production,
marketing, distribution, sales or purchasing, as well as information sharing,
so long as they are not using the collaboration to impede competition.”
In determining whether a collaboration violates antitrust law, there are
two basic tests?" First, ifan agreement tends to raise prices or reduce output,
the agreement is illegal per se.”‘ In addition to an explicit agreement, an
illegal-per-se agreement can “be established through circumstantial evidence
of ‘business behavior which evidences a unity of purpose or a common
design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful
233. Mark W. Pletcher & Ludovic C. Ghesquiere, In Restraint of Trade: The Judicial law Clerk
Hiring Plan, 78 U. Cow. L. REV. I47, 168 (2007).
234. See Daniel I. Booker, Antitrust andEmployment, A.NTl'l'RUST, Fall 1996, at 33.
235. U.S. DI’-.‘P'T or JUSTICE & FED. TRADE OoMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINIB r-‘on
Cou.ABORATIoNs AMONG COMPETITORS (2000) at 2,
hup://www.flc.govIos/2000/04/ltcdojguidelinempdf, [https:l/perma.odDP2B-RDLM] [hereinnfler
Competitor‘ Collaboration Guidelines].




observer with ev a rudimentary understanding of economics could concllxle that the annngemenls in
question could have an anficompetitive eflect on customers and nnrketsf” United States v. eBay, Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
238. Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 235, at 3.
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arrangement.’”23° If there is no agreement or business behavior evidencing a
common purpose or explicit agreement concerning conduct that is illegal per
se, a second test, known as the rule of reason, is applied?” The “nrle of
reason” test is applied to determine the overall competitive effect of an
agreement or course of conduct that does not fall within the prohibitions of
the “illegal per se” rule.“ The enforcement agency will look at the nature of
the agreement, its business purpose, the anti-competitive harm, and any pro-
competitive benefits. It looks at factors such as the market share of the
participants, whether the agreement is exclusive or non-exclusive, its
duration, and whether the agreement facilitates collusion.”
In the area of labor relations, employers violate antitrust law when they
make an explicit or implicit agreement with other employers to fix wages or
to determine whom to hire. Indeed, the Department of Justice treats blatant
compensation fixing as a criminal violation?“ Additionally, if there is found
to be such an agreement, the employee or other injured party can sue for triple
damages.“ Thus, for example, it would be a violation if an employer makes
an agreement with another company about employee salary or other terms of
compensation, either at a specific level or within a range (so-called wage-
fixing agreements). 2'“ Similarly, explicit no-poaching agreements between
employers is a violation.“
A joint bulletin by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
ofJustice’s Antitrust Division gives several examples ofconduct it considers
unlawful. In the last few years, the Department of Justice sued three
technology finns for engaging in no-poaching agreements?" And, in 2007,
it sued the Arizona Hospital Association because the member hospitals
agreed to set a schedule of pay rates for per diem nurses?" The Bulletin
239. Cason-Merarda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 625 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (quoting
Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995)).
240. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 111 18 (3d. Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
U.S. Gypsum 00., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n. 16 (1978)).
241. Id. See, e.g., Continental Television V. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (nonprice vertical
restraints on the number of fianchisees); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum resale price
maintenance agreements); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(minimum resale price maintenance agreements).
242. KAUNOWKSI, supra note 236, § 16.03.
243. Michael Lindsay, Jaime Stilson & Rebecca Bernhard, Employers Beware: The Daland FTC
Conflnn That Naked Wage-Fixirrg and "No-Poaching" Agneemems Are Per Se Antitrun Violations,
AN111'RUsr SOURCE, December 2016 at 1 (citing U.S. DEP’T or-' JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 2 (2016),
httpsv/www.justiee.gov/at:/file/903511/download [ht1ps'Jfperma.ccl3EEW-499Z] [hereinafter HR
GUIDANCE]).
244. HRGUIDANCE, supra note 243, at 2 3.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 3 4.
248. Id. at 3.
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concludes that “[g]oing forward, the DOJ intends to proceed criminally
against naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements. These types of
agreements eliminate competition in the same irredeemable way as
agreements to fix product prices or allocate customers, which have
traditionally been criminally investigated and prosecuted as hardcore cartel
conduct.’’”” The potential for an administrative action in this area would
seem to be buttressed by hearings held in 2018 by the FTC on the antitrust
implications ofpricing algorithms.’5°
a. Sharing Salary Information
AI provides a myriad of opportunities for companies to share salary
information in potential violation of antitrust laws. For example, an HR
service provider using Al to recommend salaries could aggregate data from
several companies in the same industry. Similarly, industry-specific
employer associations could use Al to mine and share data on either
individual employees or for particular job descriptions in the aggregate. The
question is whether antitrust laws—which were not designed with
employment, much less the use ofAI in employment, in mind—can be used
to regulate or prohibit this kind ofconduct.
A per se unlawful agreement to fix salaries not only includes an explicit
oral or written agreement, but can “be established through circumstantial
evidence of ‘business behavior which evidences a unity of purpose or a
common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful
arrangement.”’”' Evidence of discussions and parallel behavior may result
in a per se violation, because one can infer the parties implicitly agreed to fix
wages?” Funneling the information through a third party can constitute a per
se violation, for which there are criminal and civil penalties?” Thus, for
example, in 2018, the FTC brought (and settled) a case against two staffing
agencies who had agreed to reduce the rate they paid to the physical, speech,
and occupational therapists that the agencies supplied to home health
agencies on a contract basis?“
Even if there is no per se agreement to fix salaries, exchanging salary
information can have anti—competitive effects under the rule of reason test.
249. Id. at 4.
250. See LAT]-[AM & WATKINS, DEEP DIVE ON DEEP LEARNING: FIC CONSIDERS ARTIFICIAL
[N11-:LuGENc£ 1, (2018), htIps://www.lw.eomnhwglnLeadershipAw-deep-dive-deep-leaming-fic-
considers-artifieal-intelligence [httpsz//perma.cdNC74 35XM] [hereinafier Deep Dive].
251. See Cason-Merench v. Det1oitMed. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 625 (E.D. Mich. 2012) «quoting
Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1168) (quotations marks and citations omitted).
252. I-IRGUIDANCF, supra note 243 at 3.
253. See M. at 3 4.
254. See Mary Strimel, THE IATEYT: PIC Settles CM! Complatntfor Wage-Fixing, ANTn'Rus'r
ALERT (Aug. 2, 2018), hmpsi/www.antihustalen.com/2018/08/m1iclesIttc-developments/the-latest-fle-
settles-civil-complain1-for-wage-fixing/ [https'J/penna.ee/ZNKE-6665].
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Courts look to a variety of factors under this test such as whether the
information is: “(1) current and future infonnation; (2) company-specific; (3)
not publicly available; (4) exchanged regularly; and (5) shared with the
knowledge that it would be used to make compensation decisions.”255 As the
Department of Justice joint bulletin explains:
[w]hile agreements to share information are not per se illegal and therefore
not prosecuted criminally, they may be subject to civil antitrust liability when
they have, or are likely to have, an anticompetitive effect. Even without an
express or implicit agreement on terms of compensation among firms,
evidence of periodic exchange of current wage information in an industry
with few employers could establish an antitrust violation because, for
example, the data exchange has decreased or is likely to decrease
compensation?“
For example, one court has held that an annual salary survey ofmedical
residents could be an unreasonable restraint of trade when used in
conjunction with a matching program for job placements.’-57 This was true
even if the association issuing the survey did not discuss compensation for
residents with the medical schools, because it was reasonable to infer the
association shared the information with member medical schools to facilitate
price-fixing ofsalaries.” The fact that the survey was publicly disseminated
did not negate an antitrust violation because medical residents received only
one ofier and could not use the information to bargain with another
hospital?”
In Todd v. Exxon Corp.,"° the Second Circuit applied the rule of reason
test to determine that the Plaintiffs had plead suflicient allegations that an
agreement among six major oil companies to share salary information could
mount to an illegal salary-fixing agreement. The relevant factors were “the
specificity of the information exchanged, the defendants’ alleged market
dominance, the concentrated nature of the industry, the employees’ inability
to simply switch to other types of employers, and the defendants’ express
agreement to use the information in setting salaries.”"“ While the infonnation
was channeled through a third-party aggregator, the data was reported in such
a way that it was easy to discern the information needed to coordinate
255. Toby G. Singer, Antitrust Inrpllamons ofSurveys and Other Forms ofIrfornlauou Sharing, In
LEGAL ISSUES A.l-1-‘ECTING ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS AND OTHER TEACHING INSTlTL|TlONS, AM.
HEALTH L. Assoc. SEMINAR MATERIALS, A1-ILA-PAPERS P01270503, 1 2 (Jan. 17, 2005).
256. HRGUIDANCE, supra note 243, at 4 5.
257. See Jung v. Ass’n ofAm. Med. CoIls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 165 66, 173 74 (D.D.C. 2004).
Note that this decision occurred before legislation specifically exempting medical resident nmching
programs from antitrust laws. See Singer, supra note 255, at 4.
258. Seelung, 300 F. Supp. at 166 67.
259. Id. at 167 68.
260. 275 F.3d 191, 214 (2d Cir. 2001).
261. WIUJAM 1-IOLME & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUSI‘ LAW HANDBOOK § 2:11 n.l3
(2018).
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employee salaries?” Moreover, the Plaintiffs alleged that companies
conducted regular meetings to discuss salaries?“
There have also been several lawsuits alleging collusion by hospitals on
nurses’ salaries.’°‘ One case involved regular aggregate surveys as well as
frequent exchanges of non-aggregated compensation information among
hospitals’ HR personnel, either through phone calls orat industry meetings?"
The “aggrega ” survey data was distributed in disaggregated form so that it
was easy to “crack the code” and tell which hospitals paid what
compensation. Data more current than the three-month old federal guideline
was included, and in some cases, so were future projected pay increases.
Infonnation sometimes went through another hospital before it went to the
third-party aggregator. A federal district court found that, although there was
no explicit agreement between the hospitals to suppress nurse compensation,
the hospitals fell outside the “safety zone” criteria set forth in the DOJ/FTC
Guidelines, and that an antitrust violation may have occurred under the rule
of reason analysis?“
It seems highly likely that A] will be used to share salary infonnation. If
done though a data consolidator, it may not be illegal per se, and likely will
be analyzed under the rule-of-reason test. It is unclear at this point how the
factors described above will be applied in A1 cases.
b. Sharing Other Personnel Information
Beyond exchanging salary information, an employer can violate the
antitrust laws by sharing other types of infonnation that AI-linked
262. Corby C. Anderson & Ted P. Pearce, I7ieAntitrust Rislm ofInformation Sharing, 23 FRANCHISE
L.J. 17, 20 (2003) (discussing Todd, 275 F.3d 191).
263. Id.
264. See Jefi'Miles, The Nursing Shortage, Wage-Intbnnation sharingAmong Competing Hospitals.
and the Antitrust laws: The Nurse Wages Antitrust Litigation, 7 l-lous. 1. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 305, 306
(2007); see Lindsay et a1., Sllpfll note 243, at 5 6.
265. See Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615 17 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(quoting Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1168)).
266. Id. at 625, 647 49. According to guidance issued tbr the health care industry, the government
wiunotchallenged1eaharingofsaJaryhiformationif(1)thehrfounation ismanagedbyathirdparty; (2)
thedataismoiethan3 monthsold; md(3)“1heieareat|eastfiveproviders reportingdatauponwhich
each disseminated statistic is based, no ptovider’s data represents more than 25 percent on a
weightedbasisofth9tstatistic,andanyinfonnationdisseminatedissuflicientlyaggregatedsuchthatit
wouldnot allowrecipients to identify theprices chargedorcompensatim paidby any particularpravider.”
Salary-information exchanges about filture compensation is likely considered antieompetitive.
Additionally, enforcement agencies will consider the pm-competitive efiect of exchanging salary
information itarguablyprolnotes efliciencybyensmingprodueersare notpayingtoomuch forsalaries.
See Singer, supra note 255, at 3, (citing U.S. DEF’ OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE CoMM‘N, STATEMENTS
or AN11T|ws'r ENFORCEMENT Poucv IN HEALTH CARE (August 1996),
ht1ps'J/www.fic.gov/sites/det‘m1lt/1iledattachrnenta/compeu'tion-po1icy-
guidance/statements_ot‘_antitruat_entbreement_po1icy_in_healfl1_caie_august_1996.pdf
[https://perma.cd2PAE-JYSH] [hereinatter D01/FTC Guidelinesl).
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surveillance is designed to collect. This follows from the fact that not only is
the exchange ofprice information a possible antitrust violation, but so too is
exchange of cost infom1ation.2"’ Information gleaned from electronic
surveillance and AI algorithms has presumptive value to a firm’s bottom line
by affecting decisions regarding costs and profitability. Thus, an explicit or
implicit agreement, or a practice ofsharing such information, could run afoul
of the antitrust prohibition on information sharing.
One area that could 11.111 afoul ofthe antitrust laws is sharing infomiation
about employee benefits—health care benefits, retirement contributions, the
number ofvacation days, and the like. As with salary information exchanges,
if employers (directly or through an HR-services provider) use Al to gather
data to set benefits, they could be exposed to antitrust liability?“ Sharing
information about individual job performance, employee health issues, and
disciplinary infractions could also be violations ifthey are intentionally used
to affect hiring decisions and reduce costs.
The advent of AI makes employer information-sharing more likely to
occur, and more precise when it does.” If a company knows what its
competitors are paying, it can set its employees’ salaries and benefits
commensurately and avoid a bidding war for talent. AI may also make it
possible for one employer to mine this type of data from various sources on
the web. Or, it can hire an H.R. services provider—1ike those described
earlier in the article-—to track its employees’ individual productivity and
recommend salary increases, bonuses, etc. That H.R. services provider may
also be providing similar services to some of its competitors, and may
aggregate data from each of the companies to increase the predictive power
of its algorithms. In the process, it would necessarily pool, and share, salary
and benefit infonnation.
Courts have also found employers to be in violation ofthe antitrust laws
when they exchange what courts term “competitively sensitive information.”
While the term is vague, it has been applied to information that the
Department of Justice or FTC believes can be used to facilitate collusion or
impede other competitors. In the A1 context, such information might include
salary and benefits information, applicant histories, employee work
performance, and the like.”° On the other hand, information exchanges can
267. See Singer, supra note 255, at 2 3.
268. Id. at 2.
269. For a low-tech version of such information sharing, see Rachel Nuwer, Silicon Valley’:
Exclusive Salary Database, WIRED (July 1, 2018), l1ttps:/lwww.wired.com/story/silicon-valleys-
exclusive—salary-database! [httpsv/peuna.ecflRXU-EWNE] (describing Option Impact, a database of
tech-industry salaries compiled by and for Silicon Valley start-ups).
270. See, e.g. CARRIE MAHAN & NATALIE HAVE, WI-JL, GOTSHAL, & MANGEs LLP, NEW FFC
GUIDANCE ON lNFoILMA11oN EXCHANGE HIGI-ILIGI-ITS NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS DURING DUE DILIGENCE
AND INTEGRATION PLANNING 1 2 (April 16, 2018),
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also be procompetitive, as when they enable companies to leam new and
more efiicient methods of doing business. Thus, infonnation exchanges
between competitors are not necessarily illegal. Factors weighing in favor of
a lawful information exchange include “specific plans to maintain
confidentiality, use of third parties to handle the information exchange, and
procompetitive effects of the information exchange. The size of the group or
association involved in the exchange and the amount and type of information
exchanged are also relevant.’’”' It can also make a difference whether there
are circumstances justifying the need for an information exchange?” For
example, in Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass ’n v. United States, the
Court found that sharing price information was permissible because it was
exchanged to protect the sellers from fraudulent buyers?"
On the other hand, in United States v. Container Corp. ofAmerica, the
Court distinguished Cement Manufacturers because there were no such
“controlling circumstance[s].”27‘ In the Container Corp. case, the Court
stated that an exchange of infonnation about prices can be an antitrust
violation even if companies have not agreed to set a particular price,
especially if the exchange is of recent prices, the goods are fimgible (so that
price is the only distinguishing factor), and the industry is an oligarchy?”
Additionally, the enforcement agency considers whether an
information-exchange agreement limits independent decision making by the
companies involved.” For example, in Black v. J.P. Morgan, a federal
district court held that lenders exchanging consumer credit information via
third party credit bureaus did not violate antitrust laws because the businesses
retained the responsibility of deciding for themselves whether or not to give
credit to a particular customer?" As the court explained, “given the
legitimate function of such data, it is not a violation of § 1 [of the Sherman
Act] to exchange such information, provided that any action taken in reliance




271. Iryonnatton Exchanges, [26 No. 1] CORP. COUNS. Q., Art. 2, 14 (Jan. 2010). For a chart showing
risk factors for antitrust violations in information exchanges, see Brian R. Henry, Benclunarflng and
Antitrust, 62 AN1Tl'RUST LJ. 483, 510 (1994).
272. See generally Information Exchanges, supra note 271 (describing examples when information
exchanges are jmtified).
273. See 268 U.S. 588, 588 (1925).
274. 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969).
275. See Id. at 336 37.
276. Courts consider this using a rule-of-reason analysis. See KALINOWKSI, supra note 236.
277. Black v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 10 848, 2011 WL 4102802, at '23 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10,
2011).
278. Id. at '21 (quoting Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Oorp., 534 F.2d 1036, 1048 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410655
42 BERKELEYJOURNAL OF EAlPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 41 :1
In sum, the use of shared and consolidated AI information by employers
to guide personnel decisions has antitrust ramifications. The Department of
Justice bulletins and the decided cases make it clear that companies can
violate the antitrust laws by sharing information about employees.” On the
other hand, if companies share information about employees for legitimate
business purposes and do it through a third party employment agency or HR
services provider, but do not agree on how the information should be used or
how hiring decisions should be made, it is likely not an antitrust violation. To
date, no cases have posed these issues, but they are likely to arise before long.
c. No Poaching Agreements
Employers can face antitrust liability if they make explicit or tacit
agreements with other companies not to hire each other’s employees."‘’ The
use of AI makes these ‘no-poaching agreements’ easier to implement, and
harder to detect. As explained above, AI makes it possible for employers to
monitor, analyze, and quantify the productivity of their workers in ways not
possible before, and the proliferation of AI based HR-service providers
serving multiple companies, ofien in the same industry, provides an easy and
surreptitious mechanism for sharing such information.
For example, AI is used to ascertain which employees are the most
productive or excel at certain tasks. It would violate the law if several
employers share that data and agree they will not hire each other’s top
performers. As in the salary cases discussed above, discussions and parallel
behavior by the employers can prove that such an agreement exists, even if
there is no evidence of an explicit oral or written agreement."“ In some pre-
AI cases, courts apply a per se rule, and if that fails, the rule of reason
analysis?” And also, as in the salary cases discussed above, naked poaching
agreements can result in criminal as well as civil sanctions?”
In general, courts find a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act “[i]f a no-
poaching agreement (1) serves no legitimate business purpose, or (2) serves
a legitimate business purpose but is not narrowly tailored to meet that
purpose.”’“ Ifthe agreement is necessary for ajoint venture, merger, or some
other legitimate collaboration, then it serves a legitimate business purpose?”
279. HR GUIDANCE, supra note 243, at 4 6.
280. Black, 2011 WL 4102802, at '5.
281. See Id.
282. Lindsay et al., supra note 243, at 11; In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Llt1g., 856 F. Supp. 2d
1103,1114 15 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
283. HR GUIDANCE, supra note 243, at 4.
284. Rochella T. Davis, Talait Can’: Be Allocated: A labor Economic: Justmcatlon for Na-
Poaclung Agreenmu Cnnunallty In Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 295
(2018).
285. Lindsay et al., xupranote 243, an; see Unttedstates v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1039
40 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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So too it is lawfiil if it is narrowly tailored in a merger situation, if it is for a
limited duration, and if it is limited to “specific key employees or identifiable
categories ofemp1oyees.”2“
A series of recent Silicon Valley no-poaching cases involving eBay,
Intuit, Apple, Lucasfilm and several other companies illustrate the
application of antitrust principles to no-poaching agreements.” They
involved explicit bilateral agreements between direct competitors promising
not to cold call each other’s employees.” Moreover, eBay agreed not to hire
anyone from Intuit for a year, and Lucasfilm promised to give notice if it
made an ofl‘er to a competitor’s employee and would not offeranything above
its initial offer.” The Department of Justice found these agreements per se
unlawfiil and the defendants eventually settled.“
A separate lawsuit filed by the affected employees claimed that these
nearly identical bilateral agreements were interconnected?" The plaintiffs
asserted that each agreement involved a company under the control of the
late Steve Jobs or a company whose board shared at least one member of
Apple’s board, that senior executives fiom each of the tech companies
negotiated and enforced the bilateral agreements, and that these executives
concealed the agreements from employees and the public?” Additionally, the
complaint stated that Steve Jobs himself attempted to negotiate a similar
agreement with the CEO ofPalm.”3 The court found the employee-plaintiffs
sufficiently stated a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act.“
AI makes it more likely than ever that companies will enter into explicit
or implicit no-poaching agreements. If an HR services provider collects,
through its clients, a large volume of information about the perfonnance of
individual employees, uses that information to predict future performance,
and then provides these predictions to other employers in the same industry,
286. Lindsay et aL, supra note 243, at 10.
287. The Silicon Valley cases consist of Department of Justice enforcement actions against
technology companies. See Complaint, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10-cv-01629, 2010 WL
11417874 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd., No. 10-cv-02220, 2010
WL 5344347 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2010); Complaint, United States v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-5869, 2012 WL
5727488 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012); see also United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (denying eBay’s motion to dismiss the complain). These cases were settled with consent
judgments. See Lindsay, supra note 243, at 7. Additionally, tech company employees filed a civil suit
against their employers. In re High-Tech Enw. AntttrustLmg., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
For a similar situation in the animation and visual effects business, see Nltsch v. Dnaanrworks Animation
SKG Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270, 274 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
288. Lindsay et aL, supra note 243, at 6 7.
289. Id. at 6.
290. In re High-Tech Ernp. Antitrust Lmg., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1 103, 1109 (ND. Cal. 2012).
291. Id. at 1108.
292. Id. at 1110.
293. Id. at 1116 17.
294. Id. at 1123.
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it could be a violation, even absent explicit concerted action?” This would
be true if the companies involved then avoided hiring each other’s top
perfonners, or if they used the information to l'Cfl.1S€ to hire employees
deemed to be “trouble-mak ,” as will be discussed below.
d. Boycotts and Blacklists
The previous section described how an agreement not to peach top
employees can violate antitrust laws. A more frequent scenario is a modern
day blacklist ofemployees considered ‘trouble-makers. ’ This would occur if
two or more firms agreed not to hire individuals identified through Al as
undesirable. It would also occur if firms providing AI—aided HR services
(such as researching and interviewing prospective employees and tracking
existing employees) provide detailed information to their clients about
prospective new hires, and their clients collectively decide not to hire certain
individuals whom the data show to be unproductive, disruptive, oppositional,
or possess other negative proclivities. As will be explained, the use of shared
information to blacklist an individual can constitute an unlawfiil conspiracy
by two or more employers to restrain that individual’s participation in the
labor market. On the other hand, there can be legitimate purposes for
information sharing that would prevent antitrust liability, such as when the
shared infomiation is for purposes ofjob references or to warn of unethical
or illegal conduct. The legal question with employee blacklisting is, at what
point does either such active or passive collusion become illegal under
antitrust law? The use ofAI makes information sharing more likely to occur,
more difficult to detect, and the purposes impossible to evaluate. Thus, the
legal test, and the lines that are drawn, become blurry.
A blacklist of employees is essentially a group boycott of an employee
by employers.“ As with any Sherman Act violation, a blacklist could violate
antitrust law if it is a concerted activity and an unreasonable restraint of
trade?” Ifthese two criteria exist, then the per se, rule ofreason or quick look
test is applied to determine whether a violation occurred.“ One antitrust
expert provides a useful description ofwhen boycotts violate the law:
On the one hand, joint efforts to drive troublesome competitors out of
business are almost surely illegal, while, on the other, it is less likely to be
illegal to “boycott” a member of a business or profession who has violated
reasonable ethical or industry standards. In the uncertain middle are situations
295. Cf id. at 1117 (explaining that plaintiff: my state a claim underthe Sherman Antitrust Act
when they plead facts that “tend to exclude the possibility ofindependent action” (alteration and eitatim
omitted)).
296. Booker, supra not: 234, at 35 36; Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any
Diflbreutfrom Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally
Restnuns Ilude, 58 CATH. U.L. REV. 631, 639 40 (2009).
297. Edelman, supra note 296, at 640.
298. Id. at 640 41.
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involving joint action by industry groups that may seem political but have a
commercial purpose or effect.299
An example of an unlawful effort to drive out troublesome competitors
and control the labor market can be seen in Radovich v. National Football
League.3°° In that case, the plaintiff football player had signed a contract with
one NFL team, but asked to be traded to another NFL team after his contract
expired. The first team’s owner refused, so the player signed with a team in
the rival All-America Football Conference (AAFC). The NFL then put the
player on a five-year blacklist.3°‘ The Supreme Court held that the player had
properly stated a Sherman Act claim because the conspiracy among the NFL
and team owners inhibited players from transferring to other teams and thus
had an anti-competitive effect on the labor market for football players.”
Similarly, in Quinonez v. National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., a securities sales representative was hired and then fired by two large
securities dealers. Subsequently, no other securities finn would hire him. 3°’
The sales representative claimed that no firm would hire him “because of a
boycott growing out of the express or tacit agreement that one member firm
would not hire a person who had either been rejected or discharged by another
member firm.”3°‘ The Fifih Circuit held that the sales representative had
stated a per se claim for relief under antitrust laws.3°5
Rule of reason analysis is usually applied to employee blacklisting if
there are pro—competitive reasons for refusing to hire the employee and/or the
restrictions on competition are unclear.3°° For example, when a basketball
player was boycotted (pursuant to league rules) for gambling on the outcome
ofgames, a federal district court refused to apply a per se test, because there
299. WIILIAM M. HANNAY, DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE AN'1'1TRUSl' COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:43
(2019 20).
300. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
301. Id. at 448.
302. Id. at447. Amorereeent exampleisCoIinKnepernick’s chim tlntthe N1-'LandiIs awnershave
colluded to blacklist him for having instigated playerprotests during pregame performances ofthe national
anthem. Kaepernick's claim, however, is a contract claim brought under the collective bargaining
agreernentbetween IheNFLandtheN]-‘L Players’ Assochtiomndiathmastamtory antitrust claim The
arbitrator rejected the NFL's equivalent of3 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and set the ease for hearing. Ken
Belson, Colin Kaepenu'ck’s Collusion Case Against theNFL Wudvance, N.Y. TIMFS (Aug. 30, 2018),
Imps‘!/www.ny'times.oom/2018/08/301mm/eolin-kaepernick-collusion-case
nfl.html [ht1ps://perma.ccfI‘6U4-VEH2].The case settled in February 2019. Kevin Draper & Kai Belson,
Colin Kaepernlct and the MRL Settle Collusion Case, N.Y. Twas (Feb. 15, 2019),
hItps'J/www.nyu'mes.oom/2019/02/15/sports/nil-eolin-kaepemickmtml [hflpsz//per1na.ccI8K5Q-5L9K|
303. 540 F.2d 824, 826 (Stir Cir. 1976).
304. Id.
305. Id. at830 31. Notethatthefactsofflriscasearelikelysuflicienttoconferstnndingundersection
4 of the Clayton Act. See Robert S. Chaloupka, Antitrust Standing of Terminated Employees, 138
Axrmtusr COUNS. §[l(A) (2006).
306. WILLIAM T. Ln-‘LAND, STATE ANTITRUSF LAW § 3.06 (2019); Booker, supra note 234, at 35
36; David IL Haase & Darren M. Mu!Igets0n,Agreement.rBe1weenEmpIayers Nona Hzreliaclr Others
Employees: When Are 7heyEnforceable?, 21 LAB. LAW. 277, 283 84 (2006).
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were salutary procompetitive effects ofridding the sport ofcorrupt players.3”
Note that under a rule of reason analysis, the court focuses on whether the
labor market is harmed and what the impact on competition is, not on the
harm to the individual employee.”
On the other hand, a per se test has been applied to some employee
boycott situations.’°° For example, a Georgia federal court applied the per se
test when a golf association board consisting entirely of competing golf
players suspended another player on a whim.3'° However, courts have held
that the per se test does not apply if the governing body has a need for self-
regulation and regulation is conducted according to due process principles,“
and application of the per se rule to cases arising in the sports industry have
been called into question in more recent cases?”
Regardless of whether the per se or rule of reason standard applies, to
constitute an antitrust violation, there must be some indication that the
employers agreed, even implicitly, to blacklist employees. While AI makes
the collection, analysis, storage, and sharing of employee characteristics
easy, it does not automatically lead to an antitrust violation. If employers
using AI gather data either collaboratively or via a third party (such as an HR
services provider) but make independent decisions based on the information,
the conspiracy or collaboration element will be lacking. Thus, for example,
if an HR service provider gave multiple companies underlying information
about a worker’s disciplinary history aggregated from multiple sources, and
each company made an individual decision of whether or not to hire the
worker based on that and other infomiation, under current law there would
probably not be a violation. The information sharing would cross the line,
however, if employers, either directly (such as through an industry
association) or indirectly (through an HR provider) agreed on what
characteristics would disqualify a worker from further consideration.
Additionally, even if there were an agreement not to hire certain types
of individuals, if it embodied a procompetitive purpose, courts may find no
antitrust violation. Thus, employers may be within their rights to agree not to
307. Booker, supra note 234, at 35 36 (citing Molina: v. National Basketball Association, 190 F.
Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)).
308. Haase & Mungerson, supra note 306, at 283.
309. Booker, supra note 234, at 35 (citing Ccnsol Express Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, 602 F.2d
494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); Baughmn v. Cooper-Jarrett, 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.
Pa. 1975)).
310. Blaloclr v. Ladies Pref’! GoIfAs:'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 66 (ND. Ga. 1973).
3 I 1. Daniel Fiorenm, Blacklisted: .s‘¢;fé Sport '5 Disciplinary Policy Restrains A Coach '3 Livelihood,
27 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 113, 124 (2016) (citing Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mynt, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
1049, 1064 65 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
312. See Id. at 126 (citing U.S. Trotting Ass’n v. Chi. Downs Ass’n, 665 F.2d 781, 790 (7th Cir.
1981); Brant v. U.S. Polo Ass'n, 631 F. Supp. 71, 78 (SD. Fla. 1986)).
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hire an employee shown to be in violation of industry rules or ethics.” For
example, employers might agree not to hire employees in continual violation
of safety standards, or an accountant with a history of embezzlement, or a
nurse with a history ofopioid thefi.
In addition to the federal antitrust laws, some states have statutes3"‘
prohibiting the blacklisting of employees?” These statutes can be either
criminal or civil.” Some states provide a safe harbor for truthful job
references, however,” and it is possible that some gathering and
disseminating ofAI-gathered data may fall within the safe-harbor exceptions.
For example, if an HR service provider uses Al to scour the web for data of
misconduct, illegalities, drug use, sexual improprieties, or other improper
conduct by a job applicant, or aggregates such infomiation from its various
clients, that might likewise fall into a safe harbor exception.
In sum, employer information-sharing, no-poaching agreements, and
blacklisting can violate the antitrust laws, and the use of Al makes such
violations more likely than in the past by making infonnation about
employees easier to amass and transmit. Moreover, the use of AI by HR
companies can make the sharing of information difficult to detect because
comparative data is often built into the algorithms. Therefore, it may be
necessary to revise some ofthe doctrines in our antitrust laws to make it clear
that antitrust laws apply to the anti-competitive potential that stems from the
use of AI in the workplace. It may also be appropriate for the FTC to initiate
administrative actions similar to the hearings it held in 2018 on the antitrust
implications ofpricing algorithms.”
D. Labor Law Issues
In addition to issues AI poses under discrimination, privacy, and
antitrust laws, there are also several labor law issues that can arise from the
use of AI in the workplace. First, there is a question of whether electronic
monitoring and surveillance violates employees’ fimdamental right, under
the labor laws, to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection.
Second, where unions exist, do they have a right to bargain about the use of
AI in the workplace or to acquire infomiation about the installation and use
313. See, e.g., DOJ/FTC Guidelines, supra note 266 (noting that “a trade association my help
establish industry standards that protect the public. . . 3').
314. See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 13A-ll 123 (1975); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1361 to -1362 (2019)
(effective until June 30, 2020); CAL. LAB. Com-: §§ 1050 1053 (West 2019); Cow. REV. STAT. §§ 8-2-
now-114 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31 51 (2019).
315. Lifland, supra note 306; see generally Edward M. Cramp, Annotation, Validity, Consmiction,
and Operation ofState Blacklisung Statuta, 95 A.L.R. Stli 1 (2002). A list ofthese statutes can be found
at 1 POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1-IR SERIES) (5 60:2 (2019).
316. SeegeueraIIyCranp,supranote315.
317. Id. at § 2(3), 10.
318. SeeDeepDtve,supranote250andaccompanyingtext.
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of AI in HR decisions? Third, how does the use of Al surveillance and
algorithmic decision-making affect the ability of unions to represent
employees effectively in the grievance procedure and in collective
bargaining? These are discussed below.
1. AI and Concerted ProtectedActivity
The core provision of the National Labor Relations Act is Section 7,
which creates a right for employees to engage in “concerted activit[y] for . . .
mutual aid or protection.”3'° Section 7 has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court and the National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.), the agency that
administers the statute, as protecting employees from dismissal or other
sanctions when they engage in any collective action with the aim of
improving their position as employees. Section 7 ensures employees are free
to discuss their working conditions together and determine whether they wish
to engage in collective bargaining. Working conditions includes the topics of
wages, hours, benefits, safety conditions, employment policies and practices,
supervisors, and in some cases, customers or clients.”° Moreover, it is well-
settled that Section 7’s protection applies broadly to actions undertaken by
two or more employees, and to actions taken by an individual acting alone in
an effort to induce others to form a union, organize or participate in
workplace protests, or otherwise attempt to apply concerted pressure on an
employer to achieve a work-related goal.” Thus, if an employer penalizes
or attempts to intimidate an employee for advocating collective action around
workplace issues, it violates the labor law?” Moreover, an action by an
employer that restricts or “chills” these activities is an unfair labor practice.
For example, an employer social media policy that prohibits employees from
using Facebook to complain among themselves about their work would
violate Section 7, as would any employer search of its employees’ social
media sites to ascertain whether one or more employees is engaged in union
activity. 32’
There are many ways in which employees’ Section 7 rights can come
into conflict with employer efforts to collect data for developing or
implementing AI-enabled personnel management by means of monitoring
and surveillance. For over a hundred years, employers have attempted to
319. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 157.
320. See George H. Pike, Social Media and the Workplace, INFORMA'I1ON TODAY, Nov. 2014, at 1,
2.
321. See, e.g., N.L R.B. v. City Disposal Syss., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
322. Eastex, Inc. v. N.I..R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 563 70 (1978).
323. See Christine N. O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Unda Section 7 of the National
labor Relations Act: Exploring the Limits oflabor law Protection for Concerted Coinnmnication on
SocialMedia, 45 SUFFOLK U L. REV. 29, 32, 35 (2011) (discussing settlement ofcase involving employee
whohadpostedranad:sonFacebmkmgfllym1plyingflntha'nmafimrwasm1iymmd
disparagm‘3 him with expletives).
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monitor their employees to deter collective action and to identify and weed
out “1Jouble—makers.””‘ They have used company spies and hidden cameras,
and inserted infiltrators into employee groups in order to detect and deter
employees’ collective action?” With the enactment of the NLRA in 1935,
these and other employer surveillance tactics have frequently been
challenged as interfering with employees’ Section 7 lights.
The N.L.R.B. has held that it violates the statute for an employer to
engage in surveillance or create the impression of surveillance in order to
detect and suppress of employees’ protected Section 7 activities. Thus, for
example, it is unlawfill for a supervisor to observe employees attending a
union meeting at the union hall to vote on whether or not to strike.“ The test
is “whether the employee would reasonably assume . . . that their [sic] union
activities had been placed under surveillance.””’
Of course, not all information gathering by employers is unlawfiil.
Employers have many legitimate reasons to monitor their workers. For
example, they may want to monitor workers’ locations in order to prevent
loitering on the job (“stealing time”) or to make sure employees are not
engaged in forbidden conduct, such as pilfering, stealing trade secrets,
watching pornography while at work, and so forth. They also might monitor
for safety reasons—to ensure employees are not entering hazardous areas or
to prevent strangers from entering the workplace. Employers also might want
to monitor employees’ work so they can reward exceptional performance,
promote greater effort, or track individual improvement. When the
surveillance has a legitimate purpose, but also has the potential to observe or
chill protected collective action, the N.L.R.B. considers whether the
employer’s legitimate purpose is outweighed by the burden the specific
means utilized places on employees’ Section 7 rights.”
One frequently challenged form of surveillance involves polling of
employee attitudes. Since the 1920s, employers have conducted polls of their
workers to determine whether there are morale problems and to get
suggestions for improvement?” While these are legitimate and lawfiil
purposes, when the purpose ofa poll is a disguised effort to determine which
employees are likely to support a union drive, or to intimidate potential union
324. See sources cited supra note 95.
325. Id.
326. Ivy Steel & wue, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 404, 404 (2006).
327. Id.
323. compare SJ.P.R., Iilc., 306 N.L 113. 172, 172 (1992) (finding surveillance unlawful because
it“eoustit1Iedmorethanondimry orcasual observation”andtheie was noevideuceof“safety orpropeity”
concerns) with Halo Lighting Div. of MeGraw Edison 0a., 259 N.L KB. 702, 716 (1981) (finding
surveillance lawful because ofthe “possibility ofviolenee” and the fact that an altercation had already
ocalrred).
329. Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Attitude Surveys In Hmorlca! Perspective, 27 INDus. RELS. 74,
75 (1988).
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supports into silence or inactivity, it will be found to be unlawful.”° In fact,
the N.L.R.B. has gone beyond explicit polls; it has found a violation when an
employer action forces an employee to make an “observable choice” or
otherwise publicly display their support or opposition to a union.”'
Another common form of employer surveillance is the use of hidden
cameras. Employers often install cameras to prevent pilferage or shirking on
the job. Cameras can also identify hazardous conditions and facilitate
proactive safety interventions. These concerns are legitimate and do not
violate the statute. However, surveillance cameras can also spy on
employees’ organifing activities, picket lines, or other protected conduct As
a result, the N.L.R.B. has considered when the use of overt and hidden
surveillance cameras interferes with employees’ rights to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection. In several cases, the N.L.R.B. has held
that “absent legitimate justification, an employer’s photographing of its
employees while they are engaged in protected concerted activities
constitutes unlawful surveillance.”3” However, it has also held that it is
lawful for an employer to photograph or videotape certain activities outside
his plant without violating the Act “where he can establish a legitimate
purpose for this activity.’’”3
To determine the lawfulness ofa particular instance of surveillance, the
N.L.R.B. considers whether the employer has used surveillance to target a
specific individual suspected of union activity, or whether an employer has
changed its level and type of surveillance in light of a union drive.“ The
N.L.R.B. has stated that “[a]lthough an employer may observe open union
activity on or near its property, an employer may not do something ‘out of
330. See, e.g., Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (articulating test for determining
whether polling is unlawful efi'ort to intimidate enployees).
331. See, e.g., Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 333 N.L.R.B. 734, 745 (2001), enflrrced, 301 F.3d 167 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“[The employer] violated Section 8(a)(1) by approaching employees and asking
memmmnsentmbefilmedfmmewrposeofacanipaignvidemapgandbymquifingployeesto
registeran objection with an agent of [Allegheny Ludlmn] in orderto avoid being included in its campaign
videotape"because the request “forcedemployees to make anobservablechoicethntdemrmshntes their
support for or rejection ofthe union.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
332. Bnmswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 803, 807 (1982); U.S. SteelCorp., 255 N.L.R.B. 1338,
1338 (1981); accord Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1269 (1997); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234
N.L.R.B. 1309, 1320 21 (1978); Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 213 N.L.R B. 197, 207 (1974); Flzunbeau
Plastics Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 735, 743 (1967).
333. Lechrnere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 99 100 (1989) (finding no violation when employer installed
mtafingcanremsoimideitssmremordamdatafllegaladivitymflreparkinglotsndapprdrend
shopliflers).
334. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 674, 683 84 (1996) (holding no violation where a
supemsorwmchedoverflnshopflwrfiomhisnommnysssignedwmkueammdummkewm
everything was nmning smoothly and incidentally observed organizing activity).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410655
2020 AI & ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 51
the ordinary’ to give employees the impression that it is engaging in
surveillance oftheir protected activities.””5
In the late twentieth century, employers began to use GPS tracking
devices on vehicles to monitor their workers’ on-the-job activities. The
trackers indicated whether workers were wasting time and whether they were
meeting productivity standards.” Although GPS tracking devices were
resisted by drivers and opposed by unions on the grounds they were intrusive
and oppressive,”7 such devices were usually found to not be unreasonable
impingements on Section 7 activities in nonunion workplaces.” However,
the N.L.R.B. concluded that the use of such devices does interfere with
Section 7 rights when it is used to track the movements ofspecific individuals
involved in organizing carnpaigns.33° Moreover, the N.L.R.B. also held that
in the presence ofa union, the installation of GPS can constitute a change in
working conditions that is subject to a mandatory bargaining obligation?”
Today’s methods of surveillance are an even greater threat to workers’
Section 7 rights than old-fashioned polls, cameras, or even basic GPS
trackers. Electronic badges, cell phone applications, RFID, wearable devices
and other AI-enhanced surveillance devices can be used for legitimate
purposes such as to improve productivity or prevent theft, but they can also
be used to listen to employees’ conversations, record employee movements,
monitor biological reactions, and identify participants in employee
gatherings. These uses enable an employer to pinpoint union supporters and
intimidate others.
335. Sprain Brook Manor Nursing Home, 351 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1191 (2007); Cf lntertape Polymer
Corp., v. N.L.R.B., 801 F.3d 224, 234 4| (4th Cir. 2015) (finding no violation when employer had a
legitimate reason to be present at the location where it observed the employees’ union activities); Ahddin
Gaming, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 585 87 (2005) (“A superv'wor’s routine observation of employees
engaged in open Section 7 activity on company property does not constitute unlawfirl surveilknee").
336. NAT'L Woruuuarns INST., ON YOUR TRACKS: GPS TRACKING [N THE WORKPLACE 6 7
(reporting widespread use of GPS on commercial vehicles by ployers by early 2000s),
https://q>ic.orglprivacy/workplace/gps-t1'aking.pdf [hltpsz//perrna.ccf1‘8JG-M66V].
337. See, e.g., Id. at 10 (describing protest action by snowplow drivers in Massachusetts alter their
employer insfitnted requirement that they carry GPS-enabled cell phones to monitor their speed).
338. See e.g., CSC Holdings, L.L.C., No. 29-CA-190108, 2018 WL 2003170 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges) (April 27, 2018) (finding no violation for installation of a GPS tracker in vehicles of sales
representations because they have no expectatim ofprivacy in the company's equipment).
(finding no violation for installation of a GPS tracker in vehicles of sales representations because they
have no expectation ofprivacy in the eompany’s equipment).
339. N.L.R.B., Advice Memo. on East Coast Mech., No. 22-CA-253245 (Feb. 6, 2003).
340. N.L.R.B., Advice Memo. on BP Expl. Of Alaska, Inc., Case 19-CA-29566 (July 11, 2005)
(imposing obligation’ to bargain‘ with rmion over employer unilateral‘ maul’lation of GPS monitoring in
trucks). See also Great Western Produce, Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1004, 1024 (1990) (holding that the unilateral
implementation of certain work rules, including a record-keeping system that tracked employees‘
shortcomings, violated section 8(a)(5)). Butsee N.L.R.B., Advice Memo. on Roadway Express, Inc., Case
I3-CA-39940 (Apr. 15, 2002) (concluding there was no duty to bargain over employer's unihter-al
implmnmuimofGPSsynmbemrmedflvaswemalreadymquhedmminmmcmsmmmnmdwhh
dispatchers viatwo-way radio, sothenewsystemwasnotasignificant change inworkingconditions.)
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As explained above, the N.L.R.B. has maintained that surveillance, or
creating an impression of surveillance, is an unlawful interference with
Section 7 rights unless there is a legitimate justification that outweighs the
coercive nature of the surveillance. However, the standard begs the question
ofwhat constitutes legitimate justification and how to weigh the factors when
the N.L.R.B. engages in balancing. In the era of AI and management
analytics, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent employers’
detailed data collection about their employees’ whereabouts, conversations,
social networks, off-work activities, personal habits, interests, proclivities
and moods are found to be labor law violations. Afier all, a device that listens
in on conversations can pick up union talk more effectively than can any
company spy. Moreover, an AI algorithm that uses biomarkers and body
language to identify which employees are dissatisfied at work can predict
which ones are likely to become union supporters or simply troublemakers.
These uses ofelectronic monitoring surely pose a danger to workers’ Section
7 rights.
To date there have been no cases considering when the use ofadvanced
monitoring and AI, even for legitimate efficiency purposes, run afoul of the
labor laws. However, there are some cases that bear on a related issue:
whether employer can monitor employee emails, social media postings, and
other online activities inside or outside of the workplace.
In November 2010, the N.L.RB. brought a charge against an employer
for firing an employee who had disparaged her supervisor on her Facebook
page?" The N.L.R.B. maintained that the posting was concerted protected
activity under the labor law. While this case was ultimately settled, the
N.L.R.B. has, until recently, continued to maintain that social media postings
by employees are protected activities with which an employer cannot
interfere absent significant justification. For example, in 2015, the N.L.R.B.
held that an employer cannot maintain a policy that places limits on
employees’ ability to discuss the company on social media. In Bach Imports,
it stated that
[T]he [company’s] social media rule required employees to identify
themselves when posting comments about the Respondent, the Respondent’s
business, or a policy issue. This rule was overly broad, because employees
would reasonably construe it to cover comments about their terms and
conditions ofemployment, and the self-identification requirement reasonably
would interfere with their protected activity in
various social media outlets.”
However, the lawfiilness of employer monitoring of employee online
activity is currently in flux. Since April 2018, the five member N.L.R.B. has
341. See David L. Bayer, Employers Are NotFrIend3 With Facebook: How the N.L.R.B. Is Protealng
Enplayees ' Social Media Activity, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169, 174 (2012).
342. Boch Imports, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 706, 707 (2015), q0"d, 826 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2016).
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had a majority of Republican members, with three members having been
appointed by President Donald Trump.” Accordingly, the scope of lawful
employer surveillance has widened. In particular, two recent decisions
suggest that the N.L.R.B. may soon reverse its position and may instead be
moving in the direction of permitting employers to restrict and monitor
employee electronic communications.
In 2014, the N.L.R.B. held in Purple Communications that employers
carmot bar employees from using a company email system for nonwork
related purposes, including union communications.’“ The decision was
heavily criticized by employers, and on August 1, 2018, the Trump Board
announced that it was reconsidering the decision. In Caesars Entertainment
Corp., the N.L.R.B. invited all interested amici to submit briefs on the
questions of whether Purple Communications should be overruled, what the
standard for employers’ regulation of employee email and other electronic
communication should be, and whether the standard it adopts should also
apply to regulation ofemployees’ use of instant messages, texts, postings on
social media.” Most commentators believe the call for briefs signifies a
major retreat in the N.L.R.B.’s policing of employers’ electronic
communications policy, at least in the workplace.
The N.L.R.B.’s call for reconsideration of Purple Communications
follow on its decision, issued on December 14, 2017, in Boeing Corp., where
it held that an employer can maintain a no-camera rule, including a
prohibition on cell phones, in its premises even if the rule interferes with
and/or is likely to chill employees’ protected activity?“ In Boeing, the
N.L.R.B. expressly overruled a 2004 precedent in which the N.L.R.B.
announced it would analyze employer rules that affect employee exercise of
Section 7 rights under a standard that considered whether “(l) employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the
rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.’’”7 The N.L.R.B. went
beyond approving the employer’s no—cameta rule to state that an employer is
permitted to maintain a rule that requires employees to engage in
“harmonious interactions and relationships” and maintain “respect and
civility,” even if such a rule could prevent employees fi'om criticizing the
343. Manbers of the N.L.R.B. Since 1935, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
https'J/www.N.L.R.B..gov/about-N.L.R.BJwho-we-are/board/members-N.L.R.B.-1935
[https:/Iperma.cc/SPP4-LSWA] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
344. Purple Commimications, 361 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1050 (2014).
345. Case 28-CA-060841, 2018 WL 3703476 (N.L.R.B.) (Aug. 1, 2018).
346. The Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154, at '19 (Dec.14, 2017). It stated tlnt “We find that any
adverse impact ofBoeing's no-aunela rule on the exercise ofsection 7 rights is comparatively slight and
is outweighed by substantial and important justifications associated with the no-camera rule's
maintenance.”
347. Id. at 24 (quoting Lutheran Heritage Village Livonia, 343 N.L.R B. 646, 647 (2004)).
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employer and organizing opposition. A dissent by Member McFarren pointed
out that “civility rules” were not at issue in the case, and that, moreover, such
rules are ofien understood by employees to bar them from engaging in union
organizing, strikes, and other protected conduct. He stated,
Our experience demonstrates, moreover, that the fear of reprisal that is
instilled in employees by overbroad “civility rules” is well-founded. The
cases in which employers have applied such rules to discipline or discharge
employees for engaging in protected concerted activity are numerous. These
cases confirm the tendency of employers to interpret overbroad and
ambiguous civility rules to prohibit conduct that is clearly protected under
the Act.”
Caesars Entertainment Corp. and the Boeing Corp. case suggest that the
current N.L.R.B. is likely to approve of employers’ use of extensive
monitoring of employees’ online and electronic communications in order to
police the newly authorized civility rules. If so, the labor law will be no
barrier to extensive monitoring and surveillance of employees’ online
activities, monitoring that could be used to amass data for use in A1 enabled
employee assessments.
2. The Duty to Bargain over AI and Electronic Surveillance
Under the labor law, when a union is certified as a representative of a
majority of a bargaining unit the employer has an obligation to bargain with
it over wages, hours, and working conditions.” In addition, an employer
carmot make a unilateral change in existing wages, hours, and working
conditions without first bargaining with the union to the point of impasse.35°
These principles have important implications for the implementation ofAI in
the unionized workplace.
As explained above, an employer has considerable latitude to engage in
surveillance and monitoring if it does so for a legitimate purpose. That said,
once there is a union certified, an employer must bargain with a union about
348. Member McFarran, dissenting, also stated:
First, the majority makes no genuine attempt todefine the “basic standards ofcivility.” What
arethosestandards andwluituethey,inparficular,inaworlcplacesetting?Aretheyreallythe
same, nmeover, in every workplace setting? The same on a construction site as in a hospital?
Thesameonaloadingdockasinaretailstore? Seoond,flie1najorityseansoblivioustothe
possibility that common forms of protected concerted activity under the National Labor
Relations Act may reasonably be understood as uncivil. Does walking ofithejob to protest
imsatie workingeonditionseonfonnto“basic standardsofcivility”?0rdis1ributingliterature
that, in impolite hnguap, criticizesan employer's faflure topay employees what they are owed
and in-ges employees to resist? The majority’: apparent decisim to permit all employers to
nnintain whatever“civility” mlesthey wish simply ignores thereality ofthe hbordisputes that
can arise in various workplaces and move ployees to act to defend themselves just as
federal labor law aims to encourage.
Id. at ‘39.
349. 58 U.S.C. l58(a)(5) (2012).
350. N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 735, 745 (1952).
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the use and placement of surveillance cameras.”‘ In addition, the installation
of GPS trackers can be considered a change in working conditions that is
subject to a duty to bargain. Logically, the same rationale would apply to the
installation ofother trackers and bio-monitors, so that they too would subject
employers to a bargaining obligation. In those instances, an employer would
be required to bargain with the union prior to implementing AI related
monitoring.
For example, in Chemical Solvents, Inc. ,35 an employer installed
surveillance cameras to which a union objected. The N.L.R.B. ruled the
employer violated the duty to bargain by installing the cameras without first
bargaining with the union. It explained:
It is diflicult to accept the proposition that cameras clearly visible to
employees are of less concern to employees than hidden ones or would have
less potential impact on their working environment. Indeed, the contrary
could be argued. The placement of at least some of the cameras resulted in
their viewing areas of the facility regularly used by employees. I do not
dispute the Respondent’s contention that the new cameras comported with
DHS’ suggested security measures. However, the Respondent has not shown
that DHS required the particular number of new cameras or their particular
locations. Those matters aside, other issues also could have been raised or
discussed during bargaining, such as the size of the cameras or how their
purpose could be best communicated to employees. I cannot, therefore,
accept the Respondent’s summary conclusion that “[b]argaining would have
been futile and unproductive.”353
The cases supporting a bargaining obligation for surveillance cameras
and GPA trackers may not apply to all types ofelectronic monitoring, for two
reasons. First, there is only a bargaining obligation if the devices are found
to be “mandatory subjects ofcollective bargaining.’’”‘‘ The N.L.R.B. and the
Supreme Court have stated that not all matters of concern to employees are
subject to “mandatory bargaining,” and specifically that employers have no
duty to bargain about “managerial decisions, which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control.3”“ While the N.L.R.B. has found that the installation
ofGPS trackers and cameras are a mandatory subject ofbargaining, the issue
of other monitoring devices is as yet an open question.
Second, even ifsuch devices are determined to be subjects ofmandatory
bargaining, the duty to bargain only requires an employer to refrain from
2
351. In Colgate-Palmolive Company, the Board held that an employer must bargain with a union
overflreplacemanofhiddarwweflhncecamemsbecausemeuseofmnhcamerasisgermanetothe
working environment and not within management's core entrepreneurial concerns. 323 NLRB. 515
(1997). Accord, Nat’! Steel Corp., 335 N.L.R.B. 747 (2001).
352. 362 N.L.R.B. 1469, 1503 (2015).
353. Id.
354. N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. ofBorg-Wamer Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348 (1958).
355. Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, 1., concurring).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410655
56 BERKELEYJOURNAL OF EAlPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 41 :1
introducing them until it has bargained with a union until impasse. Once
impasse is reached, the employer is permitted to implement its proposed
changes.” Thus the duty to bargain gives the union the leverage ofdelay and
the right to infomiation, but it does not preclude the installation ofthe devices
altogether.
Another issue that is sure to arise is whether an employer must bargain
about the use of AI algorithms to guide it in decisions concerning discipline,
job assignment, or promotion. There would also be a related issue about
employees’ rights to see and contest the conclusions of any AI-enhanced
personnel information. For these questions, as with the installation of
electronic monitoring devices, the outcome would turn on whether these
issues are subjects ofmandatory bargaining?”
E. Union Representation in the Era ofAlgorithmic Decision-Making
Unions represent employees both in the handling of grievances and in
the negotiation of agreements. In both capacities, they need access to
infomiation gleaned by electronic monitoring and to the process by which AI
is implemented in employer decision-making.
The Supreme Court has held that a union has a right to information
necessary for it to participate in meaningful bargaining.”' In order to trigger
a bargaining obligation, the union must request the infomiation, and it must
show that the information is relevant and necessary for the union to raise and
discuss intelligently the issue in bargaining.” A corollary of the employer’s
duty to bargain over installing electronic surveillance and using AI in
employee evaluation and discipline is a duty to provide a union with
information about an employer's practices and prospective plans regarding
the use of Al for personnel management decisions for the purposes of
bargaining. With such infomiation, a union could bargain for transparency
about the use of AI and place some limits on the extent and uses of
surveillance.
As with bargaining, unions also need access to AI information in order
to effectively represent employees in the grievance procedure. When
electronic monitoring and AI algorithms are used to detect employee
misconduct, a union representing the employee will seek to refute the charges
356. N.L.R.B. v. Kntz, 369 U.S. 136, 741 (1962).
357. Adaaileddiscussimofthefactomdaeminmgwhmissuesammmjectsofmnndmory
bargainingandwhicharenotisbeyondthescopeofthispaper. However, itbearsnotingthatthestnndard
is often elusive and the decisions are hotly contested. See, e.g., First Nat'l Mnint. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S.
666, 686 (1981) (finding no dutyto bargain about an ea.-qaloyefs decision to close part ofits operation
once a union was certified).
358. N.L.R.B. V. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
359. N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works 217 F.2d 593, 594 (1954). See also S.L. Allen & Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 714, 728 (1936).
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or mitigate the punishment. For example, nearly all collective bargaining
agreements restrict an employer’s right to dismiss a worker to situations
where it has “just cause” to do so. The just cause standard is vague and open-
ended, and cases are often decided by an arbitrator. However, to determine
whether there has been just cause, a union needs to know what informed a
decision that is in dispute. An employer might decide to terminate an
employee whose productivity is below average on the grounds that it does
not believe that the employee will not improve. The prediction might be the
result of an AI assessment of the employee’s past and present biological
markers and emotional states. The union would need to understand how all
these factors fit into the assessment in order to effectively counter it.
The Supreme Court has held that union representatives are entitled to
relevant information to enable them to perform their function in the grievance
procedure.3°° Thus, presumably, an employer who based a disciplinary action
against an employee on the ground that a company rule was breached where
it learned of the breach from a GPS device, an electronic listening device, a
hidden camera, or a behavior monitor, would be required to reveal how the
rule infraction was discerned. Moreover, if an employer based a disciplinary
decision on the conclusion of an AI algorithm, that too would have to be
revealed.
Although there is, to date, no case directly on point, there is some case
law on a related issue that supports the conclusion that the duty to provide
information includes a duty to reveal electronic monitoring. In Michigan
State Employees Ass ’n,”' the employer installed a new voicemail system.
The union, COSA, learned that it was telling callers that their telephone
conversations might be recorded. Because the collective-bargaining
agreement between the employer and COSA allows employees to use the
employer’s telephones and email for union business, COSA submitted an
information request asking when the employer began using this recorded
telephone greeting, whether it monitored employee email communications,
and, if so, when it began doing so, and which employees’ email had
been monitored. It also asked for the employer’s rationale or business
necessity for monitoring emails, and for any written communications sent to
employees advising them that their email might be monitored. The president,
Moore, replied by letter, but failed to provide the date when the phone system
began advising callers that their conversations could be monitored and
refused to provide information about whether it monitored employees’ email.
Instead, Moore’s letter stated that “[t]he computers and MSEA.org email
domains are the property of MSEA and the Employer is well within its
Management fights.” The union brought an unfair labor practice proceeding
360. N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.s. 432, 436 38 (1967).
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at the N.L.R.B., challenging the failure to provide the information. The
N.L.R.B. ruled that the union was entitled to the infomiation it had requested
and that employer acted unlawfirlly when it refused to do so. It explained
that:
[E]ven if. . . Respondent owned the computers which the employees used
and. . . [e]ven assuming . . . that. . . Respondent was ‘within its
Managements’ when it installed the electronic equipment, a right to make a
unilateral change in a condition of employment doesn’t affect either the
union’s entitlement to information about the change or the employer’s duty
to provide that information.”2
In a similar vein, the N.L.R.B. has held that an employer cannot resist
an information request concerning its disciplinary actions on the grounds that
the request is too burdensome. Rather, the N.L.R.B. takes the position that a
union needs such infonnation in order to evaluate the strength of any
employee’s grievance and determine whether or not to pursue it, thereby
eliminating frivolous claims at an early stage.” Hence it is fair to conclude
that unions are entitled to information about the use ofAI and the results of
electronic monitoring when the information is germane to a specific
grievance.
Obviously, obtaining information does not guarantee success in the
grievance procedure. To be effective, unions need to be able to interpret,
evaluate, and refute the conclusions drawn from AI-enhanced decision-
making. To do so, unions need more than the algorithm and the raw data-
they need to understand how the algorithm works and what information is
used and excluded in reaching its conclusion. For this, they may need to hire
experts in Al and computer engineering to assist with grievance handling and
bargaining preparations. Unions have a long history ofutilizing experts, such
as economists to evaluate employer wage concession demands or industrial
hygienists to monitor workplace health and safety conditions?“ In the world
of management by AI, it would be appropriate and necessary for unions to
turn to Al experts to assist them in protecting workers rights and defending
workplace justice in the evolving world ofpeople analytics.
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III. POLICY PRESCRIPFIONS AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Employers and HR services providers today are gathering, analyzing,
and using huge quantities of data to screen potential new hires, monitor
existing workers, and hiring, discipline, and firing decisions. Literally dozens
ofcompanies have been created in the past five years to provide such services
to employers.” Yet the field is only in its infancy. Its true impact will not be
felt for another several years, until these companies will have gathered
enough data on enough workers to be able to predict reliably the future
behavior of applicants and existing workers on an individualized basis. By
that point, job interviews, resumes, and work histories may well be irrelevant,
because employers will have access to datasets from an individual’s past
work history that can be mined to identify or predict not only performance
history, but also things like race, union proclivity, work ethic, personality,
political affiliation, employer loyalty, and future health care costs.
Both gathering and using such data have enormous implications for the
application of existing workplace laws, yet are occurring with no legal or
regulatory oversight. Perhaps existing laws will be sufficiently adaptable to
respond to these new conditions, but there is significant risk they will not.”
Moreover, given the blinding pace at which companies currently are
collecting data on workers, a legal response may quickly become a moot
point. Once sufficient data are collected, it likely will be difficult to put the
genie back in the bottle.
This article discusses four different areas of law affecting the workplace
that are particularly endangered by AI: anti-discrimination law, privacy law,
antitrust law, and labor law. Of these, antidiscrimination law is the area that
has, by far, received the most scholarly attention. Yet research to-date has
focused almost exclusively on how Al might have a discriminatory effect on
hiring decisions?“ Much more research needs to be done on whether and
how AI will have a discriminatory effect on monitoring, career-tracking,
disciplining, and firing workers.
Additionally, Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws need to be
interpreted or amended to protect workers from potential discrimination
caused by the use ofAI technology. For example, the law ofdisparate impact
should be clarified to ensure that plaintiffs need to show, in their prima facie
case, only that an algorithm as a whole caused a disparate impact; plaintiffs
should not be expected to show precisely how the algorithm produced the
bias. Similarly, afier a plaintifi‘ makes a prima facie showing, the burden
should be squarely on the employer to reverse—engineer the algorithm,
explain how it made its hiring recommendations, and demonstrate that each
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factor going into the recommendation is consistent with business necessity.
Finally, standards should be set for auditing algorithms used in the hiring
process to identify algorithm inputs and monitor algorithm outputs in order
to ensure nondiscrimination.
The other areas of law have received little or no scholarly attention to
date. As discussed in Part II.B, above, current American privacy laws give
workers very little protection from collection and use of their personal and
professional data. Moreover, there are many open questions that will define
the scope of worker privacy rights, such as whether workers have an
ownership interest in data compiled from or about them, whether and under
what circumstances they can exclude others from seeing or using such data,
whether they have a right to access the data, whether their data travel with
them as a lifetime electronic resume that they can neither see not rebut, and
whether workers have recourse if their data is incorrect and is used in an
adverse employment action or is shared with others.
The United States Congress should enact a national omnibus privacy
statute, using the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’“ as
a starting point but augmenting it to specifically address data collection in the
employment context. The GDPR gives citizens of the European Union
certain rights over their “personal data” — meaning “infonnation that relates
to an identified or identifiable individ ” — that is collected or retained by
others. Though the GDPR was not specifically aimed at data collected by Al,
or data collected in the workplace, many of its provisions appear to apply in
that context. Examples include the right to access personal data (Article 15),
the right to correct erroneous data (Article 16), the right to be forgotten
(Article 17, and the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on
automated processing, including profiling (Article 22)?“ This latter right, if
applied to the employment context, might prevent an employer from
terminating a worker based solely on data obtained from Al surveillance.
Any statute enacted in the US should give workers the right to access to,
and prevent the sharing of, personal employment-related data, including
video-recorded job interviews, information gained through monitoring by
previous employers, and personality tests. Additionally, the statute should
restrict or require prior notice and consent for electronic monitoring and
employer access to employees’ social media accounts.
In the antitrust context, using artificial intelligence in the workplace may
violate existing antitrust laws if data collected from multiple employers
within an industry are used to blackball “undesirable” workers or to establish
no-poaching agreements Moreover, it is likely to be found to be a violation
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if an algorithm uses industry-wide data to set salaries, or if an HR services
provider uses data gathered from multiple companies to make hiring, salary,
job classification, or other such employment-related decisions or
recommendations. The antitrust laws should be interpreted to clarify that
these all are forms of information sharing are prohibited conduct. The
Federal Trade Commission is positioned to draw the line between permitted
and prohibited conduct, such as the line between anticompetitive and
procompetitive exchanges of salary or benefits information. The agency held
hearings in 2018 on the use ofalgorithms to set consumer prices,37° and these
could provide a starting point for such regulation.
In the labor law context, AI raises fundamental questions about the
ability of workers to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, whether unions have a right—and whether employers have a
corresponding duty—duty to bargain about workplace monitoring and data
collection, and the ability of unions to represent employees effectively in the
grievance procedure or in collective bargaining. Future N.L.R.B. and court
decisions should clarify that employer surveillance with the purpose or effect
of chilling conceited activity is unlawfiil under Section 7. Similarly, Section
7 should be interpreted to prohibit employers from using electronic
surveillance, biomarkers, keystroke/email surveillance sofiware, or other
monitoring technologies in ways that might identify current or potential
union activity, or to mine social media for the same effect. Section 8(a)(5)
should be interpreted to impose upon employers a duty to bargain with unions
over the existence and scope of electronic monitoring and the use of
algorithms in decisions involving discipline, job assignment, promotion, or
pay. It should also ensure that unions and individual employees have the
right to obtain and to contest data collected by AI. Finally, the existing duty
on employers to provide unions with information necessary for meaningful
bargaining and grievance-resolution should be extended to information about
an employer’s practices and plans regarding the use of AI in personnel
management decisions, and to information about algorithms or data collected
by AI that an employer has used in personnel decisions aflecting individual
grievants.
IV. CONCLUSION
Today’s workplace is transforming rapidly. Most visibly, workers report
to a dizzying array oftraditional employers, HR services providers, electronic
work-distributing platforms, and customers. They perform work in offices,
coffee shops, cars, and at home. Less visibly, companies are collecting
unfathomable quantities of data on workers that will significantly tilt the
370. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing I-‘TC hearings on pricing algorithms).
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balance ofworkplace power in favor ofemployers at workers’ expense. We
should not go down that path blindly.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410655
